Welcome to From Insults to Respect. I hope the beauty of spring is helping to make your daily challenges more pleasant.
Regular readers know that from time to time I write a post advocating that mental health service providers change the way people access their services so that it becomes more respectful and more consistent with the principles of science. What I mean by this, is that currently those who have a health insurance policy that includes mental health services discover that when they seek to access those services they have to first be declared as a person with a mental disorder. Not everyone is happy about this, as the following parable suggests.
The Parable of Julianne and Dr. Robles
“Hi Julianne,” says Dr. Robles, as he greets his new counselee. “What can I help you with?”
“Well, Dr. Robles, I…I….” Tears begin to form in Julianne’s lovely hazel eyes. She takes out a tissue, blows her nose, wipes her eyes, and continues. “You see, I have two young children, age 3 and 5, and my husband left us a couple of months ago. I’ve been trying to keep it together, especially for the children, you know, and, well, it’s been so hard.”
“I can imagine it would be,” Dr. Robles replies gently. “Raising two kids even under the best of circumstances is quite a challenge.”
“Yes. And now I’m trying to do it all by myself, and I’ve been feeling so depressed, and if I get any worse…. I mean I thought I better come in to prevent myself from crawling into bed and not getting out. I have to think of the children. I checked and I have mental health coverage on my insurance policy.”
“Yes, my secretary looked into that, and you do have mental health service coverage.
Your insurance company requires that I must place a diagnosis on your health insurance form for you to access that service. I hear, so far, that you are concerned about….”
“Wait! What do you mean you have to place a diagnosis on my health form? You aren’t going to write in there that I have some sort of mental disorder, are you?”
“Well, I wish we didn’t have to get into this labelling issue. Personally, I think it’s best to treat each person that I provide counseling to as an individual. It is understandable that many people don’t want to be placed in a diagnosis box, especially one known to be stigmatizing. But the insurance companies do require a diagnosis.”
“That’s not fair! I’ve been paying insurance premiums for years and I never signed any agreement that to access this service I had to be labeled like this?”
“Well, I can easily see why you feel that it is unfair. I actually agree with you. Perhaps it would help if I let you know that in the vast number of cases the information in your medical records remains confidential?”
“No, it doesn’t help! Even the most confidential government records have been hacked, and my husband and I are in a legal fight over custody of the children. If he petitions the court to see my medical records, what guarantee do I have that the court won’t end up seeing them?”
“Computer hacks do occur, and I have heard about very rare instances when courts did manage to view a person’s medical records over the patient’s objections, so your concerns are reasonable. I wish I knew of some way around this labelling requirement, but for now we are stuck with this system.”
The Purpose of the Above Scenario
In today’s scenario, we see an example of both the person seeking counseling and the mental health service provider desiring that a certain requirement of accessing mental health services be eliminated.
Unlike them, some people actually find it reassuring when a doctor declares that they have a diagnosable condition, and they experience no objection when they learn that this condition is to be placed in their medical records.
For those who believe the current mental disorder classification system is helpful, I seek not to interfere with their ability to access services in the manner that they prefer. What I do seek is that for the significant number of people who do object to the current psychiatric labelling system, they nevertheless have equal access to mental health services without the mental disorder labelling requirement.
The above scenario provides readers an example of why some object to this type of labelling, but recent surveys indicate there are many others as well. In an article published in the Journal of Humanistic Psychology (Click HERE to access the article), I discuss these surveys.
For example, here’s what Jonathan D. Raskin and Michael C. Gayle wrote when they summarized their survey data of psychologists who regularly use the standard mental disorder classification system known as the DSM (DSM-5: Do Psychologists Really Want an Alternative? 2015, pages 1-18).
“Although more than 90% of psychologists report using the DSM, they are dissatisfied with numerous aspects of it and support developing alternatives to it—something that psychologists over 30 years ago supported, as well. The finding that almost all psychologists use the DSM despite serious concerns about it raises ethical issues because professionals are ethically bound to only use instruments in which they are scientifically confident.”
In my journal article, I go on to propose a practical, more scientific alternative to the DSM. I call this alternative, the Classification and Statistical Manual of Mental Health Concerns (CSM). The first words in the CSM would be: “The developers of the CSM fully recognize that individuality outruns any classification system. It is for this reason that the CSM does not seek to classify anyone. Instead, it classifies the expressed concerns of individuals seeking to have their concerns addressed by a mental health service provider.”
After publishing my journal article, I discovered at a number of forums that many people after hearing me out, expressed that the CSM approach makes a great deal of common sense. Some also readily saw that its scientific merits are enormous because the expression of a mental health concern is a clearly observable event that occurs at a specific time and place, and therefore its use would beautifully solve the reliability problems that have been plaguing the DSM’s far more abstract, vague, theoretical construct of “mental disorder.”
On the other hand, some resisted the CSM approach. As I began to question them, seeking to figure out where exactly the disconnect was, I discovered that for some, it had to do with their belief that the DSM is a classification system based on solid principles of science and nothing could possibly be better. As I questioned them further, I discovered that their understanding of what a scientific classification system is designed to do was a bit incomplete. So, in today’s post, I explain in an easy to understand manner the nature of scientific classification systems, beginning with a description of a classification system with which we are all so very familiar–birds. This will enable us to see clearly why the bird classification system is useful as a scientific instrument. We will then look at the DSM classification system in light of what we learned about the bird system, and this will reveal the DSM‘s serious scientific shortcomings. Finally, we will compare and contrast the DSM system with the proposed CSM system in a manner that can make the superior scientific merits of the latter crystal clear.
The Bird Classification System
A branch of science begins with something some people are so interested in that they want to study it carefully and share what they find with others, while at the same time learn from others what they find out. 
As it turns out, there are some people very interested in birds.
The next thing that happens in a branch of science is careful observation of the topic of interest. After some early observations, the scientists begin to put together a classification system, which is also known as developing a taxonomy. This begins with explicitly defining what that something is that they are interested in. Said in another way, they describe that something of interest in a clear and detailed manner, leaving no room for confusion or doubt. So, in our example of “birds,” scientists have decided that they are a group of endothermic vertebrates, characterized by feathers, toothless beaked jaws, the laying of hard-shelled eggs, a high metabolic rate, a four-chambered heart, and a strong yet lightweight skeleton.
Once scientists carefully define their general topic of interest, they describe different types of what they are interested in. So in our bird example, the scientist interested in them came up with a taxonomy that lists bluejays, pigeon, sparrow, and so forth as subtypes of the general category of birds, describing each subtype in a precise manner that can reliably distinguish each from the others on their list. Why bother to do this?
The main reason is that when they discuss their findings with others, they want to make sure they are using words that mean the same thing, and it is a great time saver. For example, let’s say John is a bird scientist and he says to Judy, another scientist, “I saw a bird the other day and I didn’t know what type it was; can you help me figure out what it is?” Notice that since both of these scientists know the meaning of a bird, it saves John quite a few words. Just imagine if instead every time John uses the word bird he had to say, “I saw something that had an endothermic vertebrae, characterized by feathers, toothless beaked jaws, the laying of hard-shelled eggs, a high metabolic rate, a four-chambered heart, and a strong yet lightweight skeleton.” That’s quite a mouthful to have to say each and every time you refer to a bird. In this example, just saying bird saves a scientist about 30 words each time the word bird is used.
The word bird, once explicitly defined also saves time in other ways. For example, let’s say there was no agreed upon definition of what a bird is and no classification systems at all. 
And let’s say John, the scientist, wants to find in a library some information about a particular type of bird. He would have to waste time looking at every single book in his library until he found one that seemed to be talking about what he was interested in.
As another example of the time saving value of classification systems, let’s say “bird” was vaguely defined as a flying creature. 
This would result in John having to unnecessarily wade through numerous books on flying insects, of which there are hundreds of thousands of types, bats, and some fish that sort of can fly. With the current bird classification system, anyone can go to a library and quickly find the specific section that houses information on just birds. Similarly, placing the word “bird” in a search engine enables John to more quickly retrieve relevant information than would a less explicit definition.
The DSM Classification System
The DSM‘s overarching topic of interest is something it calls “mental disorders.” Dr Ralph Slovenko was a renowned psychiatrist. Prior to his death in 2013, he authored hundreds of articles and more than 10 books, including Psychiatry in Law/Law in Psychiatry, which went into a second edition in 2009. Let’s take a look at how he described the definition of mental disorder:
“Although this manual [the DSM] provides a classification of mental disorders, it must be admitted that no definition adequately specifies precise boundaries for the concept of “mental disorder.” The concept of mental disorder…lacks a consistent operational definition that covers all situations. All medical conditions are defined on various levels of abstraction–for example, structural pathology (e.g., ulcerated colitis), symptom presentation (e.g., migraine), deviance from a physiological norm (e.g., hypertension), and etiology (e.g., pneumonoccal pneumonia). Mental disorders have also been defined as variety of concepts (e.g., distress, discontrol, disadvantage, disability, inflexibility, irrationality, syndrome pattern, etiology, and statistical deviation). Each is a useful indicator for a mental disorder, but none is equivalent to the concept, and different situations call for different definitions.”
Dr. Slovenko goes on from here to tell us what the definition was used in the edition of the DSM back in 1994.
“In the DSM-IV, each of the mental disorders is conceptualized as a clinically significant behavioral or psychological syndrome or pattern that occurs in an individual and that is associated with present distress (e.g., a painful symptom) or disability (i.e., impairment in one or more important areas of functioning) or with a significant increase risk of suffering death, pain, disability, or an important loss of freedom.”
Now I ask you, does this definition meet your standard for being explicit? To me, it is like saying that the definition of a bird is, something that has feathers, or scales, or teeth, or is beaked, or is warm blooded. It is actually worse than that, because the difference between such descriptors as teeth and a beak can be determined with excellent reliability. Can we determine the difference between “clinically significant” and “not clinically significant” with the same degree of precision? Clinically significant is subjective, in contrast to being objective, and science requires objective definitions.
The latest edition of the DSM (DSM-5) is just as vague. It begins, “Although no definition can capture all aspects of all disorders in the range contained in the DSM-5, the following elements are required.” Although it says the following elements are required, it then makes it clear that the elements that it lists are not required. As I provide the rest of the definition, notice the use of the word “or” and “usually.”
“A mental disorder is a syndrome characterized by clinically significant disturbance in an individual’s cognitive, emotion regulation, or behavior that reflects a dysfunction in the psychological, biological, or developmental process underlying mental functioning. Mental disorders are usually associated with significant distress in social, occupational, or other important activities. An expected or culturally approved response to a common stressor or loss, such as the death of a loved one, is not a mental disorder. Socially deviant behavior (e.g., political, religious, or sexual) and conflicts that are primarily between the individual and society are not mental disorders unless the deviance or conflict results from a dysfunction in the individual, as described above.”
Again, the descriptor “clinically significant” is used, as it was in the previous edition of the DSM. 
This is about as vague a descriptor as one can possibly conjure up. How about the descriptor “dysfunction?” This, too, is left to the subjective opinion of mental health providers who often have financial interests in declaring that someone has a mental disorder.
My above critique of the mental disorder definition begs the question, Can scientists reliably distinguish those with a mental disorder from those who do not?
There is a simple scientific way to determine this. It involves randomly selecting a few hundred people from the population. Then, perhaps 20 scientists familiar with the definition would interview each in the time period usually devoted to making a so-called diagnosis in clinical practice. After each interview, each scientist would separately indicate on a piece of paper his or her decision about whether or not the person has, or does not have, a mental disorder. Each decision would be made independently from the other scientists, that is, without knowledge of the other scientists’ decisions. After this data were collected, statisticians would look to see how well the different scientists agreed with each other.
Recently, I tried to retrieve this type of study using Google Scholar by putting in the search window, “Reliability of determining who has a mental disorder and who does not.” Nothing of value came up. I tried other search terms to retrieve this basic scientific information. Again, nothing.
Eventually I found some relevant information. The vast majority of mental disorders listed in the DSM were never assessed for reliability, and the few that were indicate that this is a major area of weakness for this classification system.
Relevant to this issue is a recent peer reviewed article by Barbara S. Held in the Review of General Psychology (2017) that discusses the various mental disorder categories (p. 82-94). She states that these heterogeneous categories have produced a lack of scientific progress because of their “internal incoherence, such that any given instance (diagnosed person) may share few and, in some cases, none of the category-defining features of other persons given that same categorical label.” (p. 83)
Dr. Held goes on to say:
“This is called the problem of “polytheticity” in the theoretical/philosophical clinical literature, and is seen as a primary source of obstacles to building a progressive science of mental disorder; it is also seen as related to the daunting problem of comorbidity, which calls into question the presumably discrete nature of disorder categories.”
So, boiling down the above critique of the mental disorder construct to its basics, the construct violates principles of science because its definition is neither explicit nor objective.
The CSM Versus the DSM
I, for one, am interested in a phenomenon that I, and others, call mental health concerns. Obviously there is wide interest in this. After all, there are numerous educational institutions that provide training to people so they can become credentialed to address mental health concerns. Numerous people actually voluntarily go to these educational institutions, devoting considerable time and expense. Once completing the credentialing requirements, they apply to their state credentialing board, pay a fee, and then after the board checks to see if all of its requirements have been fulfilled, it grants a license permitting the person to legally provide mental health services. That person then sets up a practice that offers mental health services. People wishing to access these services first devote some time to decide where to go. They then make an appointment, show up for the appointment, and then express their mental health concern to the mental health service provider. Aspects of all of this occur each and everyday and involves tens of thousands of people working in a coordinated fashion to have mental health concerns addressed in a professional manner.
Now, as someone interested in this mental health concern phenomenon, I have spent some time observing the phenomenon by matriculating into undergraduate and graduate programs, and then meeting all of the requirements to provide some mental health services in my state. I’m not permitted to prescribe psychiatric drugs, and if you think electroconvulsive shock treatment is a mental health service, I can’t provide that service either.
But other then those two services, people have made appointments with me for over thirty years and expressed various mental health concerns, and I did my best to work with them to address these concerns.
So, now that I carefully observed this something that I am keenly interested in, I’m ready to put together a classification system with others interested in scientifically studying the same something. To begin the process, I first proposed in a peer-reviewed format a tentative proposal which was accepted for publication (see HERE). It defines my something of interest as follows:
A mental health concern occurs when a person seeking mental health services expresses to a mental health service provider a concern that he or she wants to have addressed.
This definition of a mental health concern requires all of the following items for a mental health concern to exist:
- A person seeking mental health services
- A mental health service provider offering his or her services
- The mental health service provider had to fulfill undergraduate and graduate training that meets the standard of his or her state licensing department.
- The person seeking services expresses a concern to a mental health service provider with the desire that he or she will work to address the expressed concern
Notice that the phenomenon that I am talking about requires that all of the various items listed exist in order for a mental health concern to be present. It is therefore far more explicit about what constitutes a mental health concern than the DSM‘s set of criteria for a mental disorder which uses language indicating that a disorder can’t really be defined clearly, but sometimes this is present, or maybe this, or maybe this, unless it is this other thing….
Also notice that no one doubts that each of the 4 listed items that, taken together, make up the mental health concern concept exists. Everyone agrees that there are people who seek mental health services in our society. Everyone agrees there are people licensed to provide mental health services. If you go further down the list, there is no question whatsoever, that these other conditions also exist. So the definition, I contend, meets the scientific standard that it describes the something of interest (mental health concern) in a clear and detailed manner, leaving no room for confusion or doubt. Once the CSM classification system comes to be fully developed, people would be able to use the term “mental health concern” as a short way to indicate a phenomenon that contains all four of its defining characteristics.
With regards to the various types of concerns that mental health service providers are asked to address by those seeking their services, two major types would be, 1. concerns expressed about oneself, and 2. concerns expressed about someone else. Under the headings of each of these two major types would be concerns regarding behavior, emotion, mood, meaning of life, death, dying, managing chronic pain, addiction, work, relationships, education, eating, cognition, sleep, hearing voices others don’t hear, and challenging life situations. This, of course, is just a preliminary list of types, and through survey data that ask psychologists and mental health advocacy groups about the various mental health concerns that they are asked to address, the list would become more fully developed.
Conclusion
The above explanation was designed to clarify just one of the reasons why the proposed CSM’s mental health concern concept provides a far more solid scientific foundation on which to build a classification system than the DSM‘s mental disorder concept. Despite the fact that many people have become convinced that the DSM‘s classification system is a sound scientific instrument, its definition is far more vague than how I propose defining a mental health concern.
Many people, including professionally trained psychiatrists and psychologists, have long argued that the mental disorder concept fails to meet the very basic principles of a valid scientific concept. We can do better by using the basic scientific standard of explicitly defining core concepts in our mental health classification system, and giving people seeking mental health services a choice about whether or not their expressed mental health concerns are to be converted into pathologizing language.
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Some people will enjoy reading this blog by beginning with the first post and then moving forward to the next more recent one; then to the next one; and so on. This permits readers to catch up on some ideas that were presented earlier and to move through all of the ideas in a systematic fashion to develop their emotional and social intelligence. To begin at the very first post you can click HERE.
Well, in thinking about this, I hasten to mention that Thomas Kuhn’s (1972) classic book, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, rightly points out, for real change to occur in a branch of science, it is not enough to point out the weaknesses of a paradigm. There needs, as well, a new approach that is a distinct improvement over the old paradigm.
Regular readers know that I have, from time to time, been dealing with a conflict regarding psychiatric diagnosis. Said briefly, there are many people who immediately lose respect for anyone who questions the validity of the mental illness/mental disorder theoretical construct. On the other hand, many people have lost respect for the psychiatric profession because of its pathologizing approach of addressing concerns related to thinking, mood, behavior, or challenging life situations. Amidst this conflict, I have been trying to put forth on this blog, and in a number of other publishing outlets, an alternative approach with which the disputing parties can live in relative peace. 
Last year, I presented a paper on this topic at the American Psychological Association convention in Denver (see 
Albert Einstein created a revolution in the branch of science known as physics. Prior to the 20th century, physicists explained the propagation of light with the use of a theoretical construct known as the ether. There were experts in the ether who described ways to define it, along with its various characteristics. It was thought, for example, that the ether didn’t move in any direction, but it could vibrate. There was much discussion about an ether wind. And then Einstein came along and described the nature of light without resorting at all to the ether.
Criticism of the mental disorder construct began at the very beginning of American psychology when William James declared that it was nothing more than superficial medical talk. Criticism continued throughout the 20th century, and when the latest version of the DSM came out, there was a ton of media and professional articles that once again pointed out its numerous scientific shortcomings. Many throughout general psychology expressed deep concerns that psychologists utilizing the DSM approach had sold out to psychiatry and the pharmaceutical industry. Moreover, they bitterly complained that a paradigm that utilizes the mental disorder construct brings down respect for psychology as a legitimate branch of science. What can be done about this?
Well, in thinking about this I hasten to mention that Thomas Kuhn’s (1972) classic book, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, rightly points out, for real change to occur in a branch of science, it is not enough to point out the weaknesses of a paradigm, there needs, as well, a new approach that is a distinct improvement over the old paradigm. So, is it possible to really come up with a distinct improvement over the current DSM approach? I think our APA can do this easily if it set its mind to it, and it can do so within a year.
Let’s say Mary Doe comes to a licensed practicing psychologist and says she has been feeling a great deal of sadness much of her days. The psychologist, for verification purposes can say, “I hear you saying that you are concerned about how sad you have been feeling much of your days, and you would like us to work together to address this concern, is that correct?” If the service seeker says yes, this would verify that a mental health concern has been expressed, and what the concern is.
Well, there you have it. I only have seven minutes to present the paper, so many of the essential points that I would love to make have to be left out. There will be some time for questions and discussion, so some additional information could be shared then. And, for those who are interested, as I point out in my paper, they can now readily retrieve a far more complete presentation of my proposal by assessing the journal article I wrote that was just published last month.
Perhaps he has come to believe that many of his most ardent supporters actually believe him when he lies, and it is the media who are telling the lies. Trump may also believe that others of his supporters don’t care that he lies because they believe business folks always exaggerate as they promote their goals, and that Trump is just promoting causes that match their values. Many Americans may therefore see his behavior not as a sign of mental illness, but simply that he is a shrewd businessman.
“I should note that nothing I am saying should besmirch the reputations of men like President Abraham Lincoln or Sir Winston Churchill, both of whom are said to have fought the ravages of major depression or bipolar disorder. One was instrumental in ridding America of slavery. The other was instrumental in saving the world from tyranny. Mahatma Gandhi, by the way, also reportedly suffered from depression. Psychiatric illness does not, a priori, disqualify a person from rendering extraordinary service to mankind.”
In the February 14, 2017 edition of the New York Times, there appears a 
Dr. Kandel’s credentials are pretty impressive–he’s a Nobel Prize laureate and professor of brain science at Columbia University. Therefore, if you are among those who believe a person’s credentials should determine who is right and who is wrong, you need not read any further. You must simply conclude that what is referred to as mental illnesses are indeed brain diseases because you would be hard pressed to find someone with better credentials disagreeing with Dr. Kandel.
The argument that such labeling practices are not scientific, but, rather, value judgments, was intelligently made by William James when he defended the religious sentiment. He explained that pathologizing these sentiments as mental diseases was superficial medical talk. He called the reasoning doctors used to declare religious beliefs a type of mental illness, “medical materialism.”
assumes as a convenient hypothesis that the dependence of mental states on bodily conditions must be thoroughgoing and complete. If we adopt the assumption, then of course what medical materialism insists on must be true in a general way, if not every detail…. But now, I ask you, how can such an existential account of facts of mental history decide in one way or another on their spiritual significance? According to the general postulate of psychology just referred to, there is not a single one of our states of mind, high or low, healthy or morbid, that has not some organic process as its condition. Scientific theories are organically conditioned just as much as religious emotions are; and if we only knew the facts intimately enough, we should doubtless see “the liver” determining the dicta of the sturdy atheist as decisively as it does those of the Methodist under conviction anxious about his soul. When it alters one way the blood that percolates it, we get the Methodist, when in another way, we get the atheist form of mind. So of all our raptures and our drynesses, our longings and pantings, our questions and beliefs. They are equally organically founded, be they religious or of non-religious content.
All states of mind are related in extremely complex ways to neural functions. There is a crucial distinction to be made between a brain difference and a brain pathology. The significance of each state of mind must be tested, not by some neurological difference, but by the value of its fruits. When the term “pathological” is applied to an experience, rather than an identified physiological pathology, it wrongly implies a neutral science classification.
In contrast to biological arguments, 
Let’s consider The Tragedy of Hamlet, Prince of Denmark, which William Shakespeare wrote in about 1604. This play offers its audience a magnificent tale of adultery, fratricide, revenge, and feigned madness by a protagonist. When reading Hamlet, we see how Shakespeare uses metaphors to vividly evoke in us the experiences of his characters. Thus, when Hamlet becomes dissatisfied that his mind keeps identifying flaws in his plans for action, he describes these plans as becoming “all sicklied o’er with pale cast of thought.” By extension, the reader senses that when Hamlet’s plans become “all sicklied o’er,” he, too, becomes in a sense, “sicklied o’er” with feelings of frustration, anguish, and helplessness.
Literature regularly uses this type of metaphor. Ralph Waldo Emerson, to take another example, once wrote:
I actually like Emerson’s disease terminology here because the context in which he uses it so obviously reveals that he is using it metaphorically. Notice how he cleverly uses diseases associated with childhood to evoke the feeling that individuals who worry themselves over problems of original sin and so on are acting, in his view, childishly. In this context, disease, to Emerson, was a metaphor for immaturity. If he were a man of science, in contrast to a literary personality, we would expect that he would use terms with clearly defined, objective meaning, that avoid value judgements.
At the time, medical writers were already heavily pathologizing a great number of experiences. Thus, James cited W. Griesinger, the author of The Pathology and Therapy of Psychological Illnesses, and T. S. Clouston, author of Clinical Lectures on Mental Diseases. As James delved further and further into the experiences being pathologized in this way, he came to believe such terminology was “simple minded” and “superficial medical talk.”
Does it make sense to say that when people are suffering, they have a “mental disorder?” Well, consider the experience of giving birth. It is typically accompanied by suffering, and yet it makes more sense to classify this experience as a natural part of creating new life rather than a pathological condition.
When writers receive rejections from publishers, or a loved one dies, suffering often accompanies these experiences. Yet, we do not typically describe them with pathological terms.
For example, cortisol levels in saliva and heart rate variability has some connection with a person’s self-reports of how much stress they have experienced in recent days, while hair cortisol levels have some connection with longer term exposure to stressful experience. Other measures of stress utilize a list of stressors, such as the recent death of a loved one, living in poverty, etc. The person being assessed places a check mark next to each of the stressors on the list that applies to him or her. These check marks are then used to calculate how much stress the person has been experiencing.
Having indicated some of the problems of unambiguously, and non-subjectively applying the descriptors of suffering to the concept of mental disorder, we now turn our attention to the descriptor, “dysfunction.” As with the notion of suffering, the pathologizers almost never use the various scientifically validated measures of functioning to determine if someone has a mental disorder. A pretty good such measure is the Scales of Independent Behavior-Revised. It has norms for functioning in such areas as social interaction (communication skills, language comprehension, language expression), personal living skills (eating and meal preparation, toileting, dressing, personal self-care, domestic skills), community living skills (time and punctuality, money and value, work skills), and gross and fine motor skills. Rather than using measures of this type, pathologizers rely on their professional privilege to make a subjective estimate of dysfunction.
In the most current edition of the DSM, someone who is experiencing abnormal levels of distress might be considered to have a mental disorder. But the issue of the boundary between normal and abnormal experiences lies at the heart of the most contentious disputes in the field of psychopathology today. A major problem with using the term abnormal as one of the defining attributes of mental illness is that it leads us to forget the fact that natural to all organisms is substantial variability across individuals and within individuals. Having above average or below average functioning in various areas of our many areas of functioning is normal. Displaying rare behavior patterns that are highly valued, such as the great altruism of Mother Teresa, are not viewed as mental disorders. Psychopathology is applied when someone does not like a particular experience. Thus, a term that masquerades as a scientific term is really a value judgment masquerading as a scientific term.
Although there are some fairly well developed scientific measures of the three major factors (suffering, functioning, and abnormality) that the psychopatholgizers tend to claim are usually part of the mental illness experience, these measures are almost never used in their “diagnostic” determination. Instead, subjective indicators of these three factors are combined into an even more subjective abstraction called “mental illness.” This process is not scientific despite claims to the contrary.
Rather than a scientific concept, the mental illness concept has been very useful as part of a highly lucrative business plan for the pharmaceutical industry and medical doctors, which includes psychiatrists. This plan has doctors first convincing people that the experiences referred to as mental illnesses are scientifically real illnesses just like physiological pathologies. It then provides license for doctors, in as little as fifteen minutes, to declare that they have provided their patients a diagnosis, and to send them on their way with a prescription for pills. With this plan, billions of dollars flow their way.
The following year, Dr Szasz published a best selling book by the same name. Some loved it while others writhed in anger. One reviewer, for example, gave it five stars out of five, and wrote:
Here is my curse on you, Thomas: May you suffer ten minutes of acute clinical depression. Ten minutes in that “over-heated room”, that “bell-jar”, that “bed of nails” which we sufferers know oh too well.
I was initially puzzled about the anger that appears to come from many who genuinely believe, and demand others believe as well, that without any doubt mental illness is an illness like any other illness. My puzzlement stemmed from my experience that oftentimes when someone proposes a different way to describe something, it doesn’t create great uproars. The proposal is either met with feelings that the new way to describe something is either helpful, or not.
William James, in his book, Pragmatism, tells us the following story. 
This human witness tries to get sight of the squirrel by moving rapidly round the tree, but no matter how fast he goes, the squirrel moves as fast in the opposite direction, and always keeps the tree between himself and the man, so that never a glimpse of him is caught. (p. 43)
“Which party is right,” I said, “depends on what you practically mean by ‘going round’ the squirrel. If you mean passing from north of him to the east, then to the south, then to the west, and then to the north again, obviously the man does go round him, for he occupies these successive positions. But if on the contrary you mean being first in front of him, then on the right of him, then behind him, then on his left, and finally in front again, it is quite obvious that the man fails to go round him, for by the compensating movement the squirrel makes, he keeps his belly turned towards the man all the time, and his back turned away. (p. 44)
Once the process of comparing and contrasting two or more descriptive approaches gets underway, it can lead to an understanding of just how vague some of the descriptions were, and they can be abandoned for more precise descriptions. Of course, the new description may also be so terribly vague as well, and nothing positive occurs. In such cases, a little time was wasted, and people get on with their lives without furious reactions.
Let me begin here by asking you to note that in the squirrel anecdote, those who discussed whether or not the squirrel went around the tree were not going to lose their job, money, freedom, or any other highly significant valued thing depending on who ended up being proved correct. Once everyone declared their positions, each might have had a little sense of prestige that might be derived if they could convince others that they came up with the most respected answer. But for people who like to discuss issues, learning from the discussion is typically the most important reward for them, and they can well handle their emotions that come from having taken a position that ends up being faulty.
The pharmaceutical companies make billions of dollars convincing people that their experiences are illnesses like any other illnesses. Thus, they claim that taking a pill to manage their illness is not any different than taking insulin for diabetes. Psychiatrists and other doctors who prescribe these drugs have an enormous financial interest in keeping this position unchallenged.
The facts are that there are numerous examples of people who could have easily been classified as having a mental illness who come to a state of enormous improvement either through a religious experience, a philosophy such as Buddhism, a delightful romantic love, an exciting new job, a support group such as AA, counseling, etc., You don’t see diabetes being “cured” by changes in relationships, work settings, religious beliefs, and thinking patterns. The fear of those invested in pharmaceutical company profits and the prescribing of their pills leads to great resistance to any descriptive changes that are not in line with the illness approach.
The second consequence that I think people fear is that people who now have access to mental health services might lose them if people stop thinking that the patterns now viewed as real illnesses are really not illnesses. Dr. Szasz’s “problems in living” alternative and my “mental health concerns” approach, they fear, will trivialize these experiences.
Some argue that if everyone could go to a mental health professional merely to have their concerns addressed, then the system would soon be overloaded with clients, and insurance policy costs would soar. Because insurance companies only cover people with more serious conditions known as mental disorders, so the argument goes, this limits the number of people who can get to see a mental health professional. However, I believe that third-party-payer executives would readily come to understand, with a little explaining, that mental health service providers now using the current mental illness approach do not turn anyone away who has mental health insurance coverage and comes to their office expressing what my approach refers to as a mental health concern. Professionals are in the business of increasing their clients. The current relevant definitions are so vague that with little imagination, anyone can be “diagnosed” as having 
Similarly, people who seriously hurt others while drinking alcohol or in some furious fit might be blamed for their actions. Thinking that they have an illness, somehow makes them blameless.
This process involves learning that there is a dramatic difference between taking some responsibility for what has occurred and blaming oneself for what has occurred. Blame suggest that you should be punished for your actions. Taking some responsibility for your actions allows one to realize that there may indeed be some very strong conditions that are out of your control regardless of whether or not you have an illness. Blaming yourself for these is not helpful, but allowing yourself to experience deeply the dissatisfied feelings about whatever control you do have can spur you to make valued changes.
Okay, so those are the three feared consequences that I have come to believe ignite anger whenever there is a discussion about conceptualizing the set of concerns now called mental illnesses. In my view, “mental health concerns” are a more apt way to conceptualize these concerns than “illnesses.” However, I fully support that for those who prefer the illness approach, that they be free to access services using that model. At the same time, I believe that ending the monopoly of the illness approach could very well stir up some valuable competition that will improve services for all.
This blog seeks to empower its readers, many of whom are directly involved in the mental health arena or will become so in the future. Others are, or will become, involved indirectly because of someone they care about. Thus, it makes sense to spend some time learning how to effectively engage with mental health service providers.
One way to achieve this is to be aware of some of the arena’s major ethical challenges. Today, we will focus on four involving psychiatric diagnoses.
The American Psychiatric Association provides a definition of a “mental disorder” in its most recent version of the Diagnosis and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-5). Let’s take a look at it:
Mental disorders are usually associated with significant distress in social, occupational, or other important activities. An expected or culturally approved response to a common stressor or loss, such as the death of a loved one, is not a mental disorder. Socially deviant behavior (e.g., political, religious, or sexual) and conflicts that are primarily between the individual and society are not mental disorders unless the deviance or conflict results from a dysfunction in the individual, as described above. (p.20) 
Notice how broad this definition is. It makes mention of a “disturbance” that reflects a “mental dysfunction in the individual.” We all run into some disturbances in our life. How can a professional reliably tell if the disturbance is due to a “mental dysfunction?” We are left in the dark about this. The process described in the DSM-5 for assessing the subjective notions of “clinical significance,” “disturbance” and “dysfunction in the individual” provides clinicians an opportunity to include anything that benefits their set of values.
If the social deviance or conflict results from a “dysfunction in the individual,” then a mental disorder exists in the individual. Once again we are left in the dark about how this distinction is made. It is left to the subjective judgment of the clinician.
An expected or culturally approved response to a common stressor or loss, such as the death of a loved one, is not a mental disorder.
Although he survives, he suffers the loss of a leg and an arm. Moreover, in the attack, two of his closest team members had burned to death in front of his eyes. This soldier seeks psychological help. He tells his story with tears running down his face and his one hand that he has left is shaking. He reports having nightmares and difficulty functioning in social situations. The clinician is well aware that such stressful experiences are fairly common under the set of circumstances faced by this soldier. And yet can anyone imagine the clinician denying services to this soldier because his response to the stressor is expected and culturally approved? If the clinician does agree to provide services, he or she would have to provide some mental disorder “diagnosis” on an intake form.
In my view, clinicians routinely ignore the “expected or socially approved” clause. It might have sounded like a good idea to insert into the mental disorder definition for those who developed the DSM-5, but I think few people genuinely believe that in practice clinicians are turning away paying customers when someone seeks help after having experienced the death of a loved one, or any other common stressor. To see such clients, clinicians are required in most mental health settings to assign a mental disorder “diagnosis.”
Most clinicians have a financial interest in deciding whether or not those seeking their services have a “clinically significant” condition. When they judge that their clients’ conditions are indeed significant, they indicate this on the third party intake forms by assigning a mental disorder “diagnosis” and this allows them to continue to see these clients and to get paid for additional visits.
Clinicians refer to mental health service users with “mental illness” and “mental disorder” terminology. These are the same terms that many people use as insults and the media regularly pairs with the most heinous crimes. The stigma associated with such terminology is well recognized. There would be some justifiable reasons to continue to use such terminology if it provided scientific precision to those who wish to communicate about those utilizing mental health services, but as we have seen, this is not the case.
The current psychiatric diagnoses approach focuses on the “dysfunctions” of individuals accessing mental health services rather than human strengths within a cultural context. Moreover, it seeks to legitimize the privileging of the “expert” who supposedly has access to the truth and who can see the truth of the truth. We see this reflected in the mental health arena when we find that it is the clinician that makes the so-called “diagnosis.” The expert is thus seen as always equipped with technical knowledge and jargons without which the truth of knowing would be imponderable. This perspective can paralyze the power of choices for mental health service users.
Although the CSM has not yet been fully developed, becoming familiar with its basic ideas are empowering. Combining these ideas with knowledge about the three psychiatric diagnoses ethical challenges–conflicts of interest, stigma, and violating the respect of mental health service users–can assist people to become far more effective in interacting with mental health service providers.
The idea that certain actions that violate societal norms are mental illnesses like any other illnesses is attractive to many people because they believe it helps to reduce this guilt and shame. To understand this a little better, let’s take a look at a quick parable:
Rachel, the mother of five-year old Jonathan, recently went through a very sad divorce. Now, at Jonathan’s parent-teacher conference, his Kindergarten teacher expresses some serious concerns. “Your son is very hyperactive and he has a great deal of difficulty paying attention. Have you considered taking him to a doctor? He may have ADHD.”
“There is no need to blame yourself,” the doctor explains. “ADHD isn’t caused by bad mothering. It is an illness very much like diabetes. Just like insulin is a drug that treats diabetes, the drug I’m prescribing for your son’s ADHD will treat his medical condition.”
But when she tells her father what the doctor has said, he grumbles and says that the doctor is full of crap. “Jonathan is angry and upset because of the divorce and not having his father with him any more. Anyone can see that!”
“Well, Rachel, I certainly don’t think you are to blame, but I don’t think Jonathan has an illness. I’m sorry to hear you are thinking about putting him on one of those ADHD drugs; they have a whole bunch of side effects.”
“You did your best, Rachel. I think it makes sense that you take some responsibility for what has happened, but blaming yourself isn’t being fair, nor is it helpful. When people blame themselves a lot of the time they think they deserve some type of punishment. In my opinion, a better way to take responsibility for what went wrong is to accept the strong emotional experiences that go along with taking responsibility, accept that you played at least a part in what went wrong, and then set yourself on becoming determined to take steps to improve. The genuine sad, heartfelt feelings that come with taking responsibility leads us to do a search for making improvements.”
In the above parable, a doctor tries to reduce the shame and guilt that a mother is feeling about her son’s behavior by framing the behavior as an illness. Although this initially appears to help, she runs into some people who refuse to go along with this anti-shame/mental illness notion. Let’s explore this notion a little more thoroughly with the help of some of the writings of psychologist and philosopher, William James.
In an 
To suggest personal will and effort to one “all sicklied o’er” with the sense of weakness, of helpless failure, and of fear, is to suggest the most horrible of things to him. What he craves is to be consoled in his very impotence, to feel the Powers of the Universe recognize and secure him, all passive and failing as he is.
From my discussions with people in Alcoholic Anonymous, it seems to me that many of its members found themselves in a state similar to what James describes in his letter. The program seems to provide them a way to stop blaming themselves by using the “I have a real sickness” idea. It also offers a sense that they could put themselves in the hands of a higher power, while, at the same time, they receive a great deal of support from peers who have managed to recover.
It is in no other way that we overcome balkiness in a horse: we divert his attention, do something to his nose or ear, lead him around in a circle, and thus get him over a place where flogging would only have made him more invincible.
By apperceiving the case as neural pathology, what does James hope to gain? He does not explicitly say. The technique that he describes of dropping the subject, diverting the mind, then springing it on the pupil later, is stated plainly enough so that many individuals can employ it without first apperceiving the case as neural pathology. I have done so, myself, on numerous occasions.
