Welcome to From Insults to Respect. Today we explore the wisdom of flinging two related insults at Donald Trump’s supporters–insults that fall under the general headings of “crazy” and “mental illness.” Let’s begin with the “crazy” insults.
The “Crazy” Insults
Trump, by all authoritative analyses, lost the 2020 election by approximately seven million votes, as well as an ample number of electoral votes. Despite this, he has, and continues to claim, he won by a landslide.
Moreover when he took government documents that he was not legally permitted to take, his lawyers had to have made clear to him this was a felony, the penalty of which is time in prison. Because a large majority of his supporters say they believe his claims and that he has done nothing wrong, many Americans think they have made sense of this by viewing his supporters as crazy. Is this wise?
“Crazy” is a concept used when people are puzzled about the actions of others or themselves. By using this type of name calling, it really doesn’t provide any clarification, but to some, they think it does. So, we might hear something like the following conversation:
“What’s going on with these Trump supporters who believe he won the election?”
“They’re crazy.”
“Yeah, that’s gotta be it.”
I understand a great many people are just fine with using the crazy concept. 
Nevertheless, I would like you to consider the following possibility.
Thinking crazy is really the explanation for why people believe as they do about Trump serves to reduce a degree of angst. Since angst can be experienced as uncomfortable, it makes some sense people might be motivated to reduce it. However, if instead, we adopt the choice to maintain this angst and come to experience it as pleasantly challenging and useful, it may lead to deeper insights.
The angst, when used in the pleasantly challenging manner, according to this theory, prods us to continue searching for understanding while keeping the door open for insights to drift in. The history of science validates the enormous progress that can be made by people who refused to let difficult problems be set aside by a nonsense concept posing as a reasonable answer.
Is the Mental Illness Concept Better than the Crazy Concept?
Trump’s supporters, in addition to being called crazy, have repeatedly been called mentally ill as a way to make sense of what seems to be irrational. Because the mental illness concept is supported by many doctors, including many psychiatrists and psychologists, some folks have been left with the impression that it must be a more sound, scientific concept than “crazy.” Is it?
Two Contrasting Opinions About One Particular “Diagnosis”
To explore this issue, let us first take a look at how the term was used against Trump in a January 11, 2021 article. It appears in Scientific American, was written by Tanya Lewis, and is titled, “The ‘Shared Psychosis’ of Donald Trump and His Loyalists.”
There we learn that psychiatrist Bandy X. Lee is affiliated with Yale University’s Department of Psychiatry, and has diagnosed those who are loyal to Trump as having the serious mental illness she calls “shared psychosis.” According to Dr. Lee, this refers to:
…the infectiousness of severe symptoms that goes beyond ordinary group psychology. When a highly symptomatic individual is placed in an influential position, the person’s symptoms can spread through the population through emotional bonds, heightening existing pathologies and inducing delusions, paranoia and propensity for violence—even in previously healthy individuals.
Although this may or may not sound plausible to you, framing it as a diagnosis based on sound scientific evidence has led to serious problems for Dr. Lee.
Shortly after her so called diagnosis, her boss at Yale, Dr. John Krystal, fired her. He had first provided her the following warning, “The recklessness of your comments creates the appearance that they are self-serving in relation to your personal political beliefs and other possible personal aspirations.”
A New York Post article titled, “Yale Psychiatrist Says She Was Fired For Calling Trump and Supporters Mentally Ill,” further develops this story. There we learn Dr. Lee has become embroiled in a lawsuit in an effort to regain her job.
“Since she was acting on a citizen’s duty to contribute her gifts to society … her speech is protected under the First Amendment,” her lawsuit claimed.
“Trump’s presidency represented an emergency which not only allowed, but required, psychiatrists in the United States to sound the alarms,” her legal team said of her “professional responsibility to protect society.”
“Trump’s mental health was affecting the mental health” of everyone in the US, “placing the country at grave risk and undermining democracy itself.”
Now, to be upfront about my own opinion about Trump, personally I disagree with him and his supporters about who actually fairly won the election. Moreover, there are a number of theories that I have been mulling over as I try to understand the reasons why his supporters have concluded his claims are true. At the same time, as a supporter of the principles of science, I recognize the importance of distinguishing my theories from facts. Dr. Lee’s theory, when couched as a doctor’s diagnosis, in my opinion, runs afoul of this principle.
Clarifying the Difference Between A So Called Psychiatric Diagnosis and The Cause For a Mental Health Concern
When psychiatrists use their mental illness classification system and call it a diagnostic system, they do so despite numerous scientific arguments about its shortcomings (see HERE for a full description of these). In brief, the “mental illness” concept is way too subjectively defined, and the vast majority of the specific mental illness labels, such as anxiety disorder, psychosis, etc., have insufficient reliability and evidence of validity to be considered scientific. Moreover, a diagnostic system speaks to etiology, that is, the cause, set of causes, or manner of causation of a disease or condition. These psychiatric labels do not come with any proof of what is the cause of what is being labeled.
To clarify what I mean by this, let us take a look at a condition with which we can all easily understand.
You have trouble starting your car. You bring it to Fred, your friendly local mechanic. On hearing your concern, he provides an initial theory of what is causing this—perhaps your car needs a new starter. This is the initial “theoretical” diagnosis. Then, Fred inspects the starter and finds that it is in fine shape. Thus, his original theory of what is wrong proves incorrect. He then theorizes that your spark plugs are dirty. He takes a look and finds that they are indeed dirty. He cleans them up, puts them back in their proper place, and the car starts right up. In the end, he “diagnosed” what was wrong with your car—it had dirty spark plugs.
Now, let us say Fred, instead, had just asked you a few questions. Then, before finding out what was the cause of why your car had not been starting, he told you that the problem is that your car has “Major Nonstarting Disorder.” This statement is very different than “diagnosing” your car’s problem unless we want to dramatically expand the definition so it loses any precision.
The psychiatric mental illness diagnostic system is described in a manual published with the title, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM). There it refers to itself as a manual for making diagnoses. This masks the difference between the following three types of statements:
- “My theory is that the reason your car is not starting is that it has a broken starter.”
- “The cause for your car not starting is it has dirty spark plugs.”
- “Your car has ‘Major Nonstarting Disorder.’”
The first statement offers some theory for understanding the cause for what someone believes has gone wrong. The second statement indicates that the cause for what has gone wrong has been clearly established. The third statement just restates the expressed concern or concerns in some jargon. The only real diagnosis in the three statements is statement 2. Statement 1 is a theory of what the diagnosis may be.
The DSM does not claim its so called “diagnostic classifications” are just a theory of what the cause is for the expressed concern; it doesn’t even provide a theory. The manual’s developers explicitly say it is theory neutral. The DSM labels are just type 3 statements, that is, just statements that restate expressed concerns into medical jargon. Thus, the lack of reliability and validity for the DSM classifications and applying the word “diagnosis” to them in a misleading, imprecise manner are just three of its many serious principles of science violations.
Contrast psychiatry’s DSM “diagnosis” system with a diagnosis system used by other doctors. If someone comes to a virologist expressing a concern about being feverish, having difficulty breathing, and loss of taste, the doctor will label these as the patient’s medical complaints, rather then simply translating the complaints into medical jargon and then claiming the jargon constitutes the diagnosis. Instead, the virologist, after writing down the various complaints, will then look for the cause for these complaints. If it is found that there is the presence of the Covid 19 virus, the doctor will say the diagnosis is a Covid 19 infection.
Now, in Dr. Lee’s legal case, we learn that she goes beyond utilizing the DSM-like label of “Shared Psychoses.” She actually provides a theory of what her concern is regarding Trump supporters. However, she doesn’t clearly state that her theory is just a theory. Thus, when people put together that she is a doctor, along with her claim that she has made her “diagnosis,” unscientific conclusions are readily made by the public.
A Brief Story To Illustrate The Problem Of Using Mental Illness Terms As Explanations
On one fine spring day, I was sitting on a Central Park bench and two women were sitting one bench just to my right reading their newspapers. Suddenly, one of them cried out, “Sophie, can you believe this! The story I’m reading here, oh my God! This young boy, seventeen years old mind you, the same age as my Jonathan, he’s struggling with ideas about suicide. Seventeen years old, his whole life before him and he wants to kill himself. What would lead a boy to this?”
“Such a young boy, Bessie?”
“Yes. My God.”
“He must have some type of mental illness.”
“Oh, you’re right, Sophie. I just glanced at the next paragraph, and a psychiatrist explains that the boy has a mental illness called major depressive disorder.”
With that explanation, the two women nodded to one another, and continued on to another story, seemingly satisfied that they now knew why the boy was dealing with this issue.
Story Discussion
This notion that when a psychiatrist says someone has a mental illness, or some type of mental illness, that this offers a valid explanation for why the person is struggling with personal difficulties is, as far as I’m concerned, a bunch of nonsense. Just before the incident in the park, I had seen a performance of Shakespeare’s Hamlet, which tells the story of a boy about the same age as the one in the story Bessie was reading and is also struggling with feelings of committing suicide. As Shakespeare’s story unfolds, the audience is presented with a character that has motivations, conflicts, frustrations, disturbing situations and emotions. In the end, I left with some insights into why a character such as Hamlet might struggle with feelings of suicide.
In my opinion, even a play, which lasts but two or three hours, can only provide in its narrative a simplified account of what real life stories are all about. And yet, in today’s world, for many people a very different type of play is sufficient for providing the reason why someone is dealing with a challenging concern. This new type of play begins with the curtain rising. A character says to the audience he is struggling with feelings of suicide. A psychiatrist then proclaims the character has the mental disorder known as major depressive disorder, and then the curtain comes down. That’s the whole play. And people walk away fully satisfied that an adequate explanation has been provided.
Conclusion
That said, I leave you with the following suggestion: If you have a theory of why people continue to support Trump and his continued claims that he won the 2020 presidential election by a landslide, let those with whom you want to share your theory know it is a “theory,” and forgo the mental illness name calling. By doing so, you may not get as many cheers from people who agree with you. Nevertheless, among people truly seeking to deepen their understanding of this difficult to understand phenomenon, you will be more respected. Moreover, for those who may disagree with your theory, they will appreciate your ability to distinguish fact from theory. You’ll come across, I theorize, as more open-minded and you will be modeling a higher level of discourse than what we have been hearing from many of our political leaders.
Some people will enjoy reading this blog by beginning with the first post and then moving forward to the next more recent one; then to the next one; and so on. This permits readers to catch up on some ideas that were presented earlier and to move through all of the ideas in a systematic fashion to develop their emotional and social intelligence. To begin at the very first post you can click HERE.
Welcome to From Insults To Respect. As several of my earlier blog posts have indicated, many professionals, mental health service users, involuntary patients, and the general public have little, to no respect, for the American Psychiatric Association’s most recent version of its Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-5).
I developed the CSM approach while working with the Task Force on Diagnostic Alternatives of the American Psychological Association’s Division 32 (Society of Humanistic Psychology). That group has not officially supported, as of yet, any single alternative. Instead, it has wisely decided that its next step is to send out a new open letter hoping to garner support for starting a process that will involve all of the mental health stakeholders including former and current mental health service users, individuals who experienced involuntary treatment, their family members, and mental health professionals.
This labeling process relies on descriptions provided in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders–Fifth edition (DSM) and the International Classification of Diseases–Tenth edition (ICD). Both are manuals that are conceptually similar, utilizing as their core concept, mental disorders, and both share the same “diagnostic” codes. Because of their similarities, I will simply refer to them as the DSM/ICD approach.
Many professionals defending the use of this approach explain that it provides a common language for mental health professionals to communicate about those utilizing their services; its various classification terms, such as major depressive disorder, anxiety disorder, and so on, are short phrases that are convenient for placing into titles and search engines, and for efficient/streamlined communication in high-speed hospitals and clinics; third-party payers of mental health services have found that their coding system works well as part of a practical method for their record keeping; with the aid of these codes, people manage to access mental health services, mental health service providers manage to get paid, and for-profit health companies tend to make a profit.
It tends to be stigmatizing to mental health service users. The lack of reliability and validity of the various so called diagnoses violate basic principles of science. The process of coming up with a psychiatric label privileges the clinician’s perspective over that of the mental health service user. It ignores the fact that many people who have been labeled with these stigmatizing psychiatric terms come to realize that the experiences which led to their seeking services, rather than being an indication of a pathological condition, are really an essential element to their creative development. Many have also expressed concerns about the “mental illness” terminology which medicalizes mental health concerns, thus leading to an incredible number of people being prescribed psychiatric drugs, the use of which leads to numerous serious side effects.
Just as I was writing this post, major news outlets began to report that researchers found nearly a 50% increased odds of dementia for those taking the most popular drugs for treating depression and other mental health concerns. Although the study could not prove conclusively that these drugs caused the increased risk of developing dementia, because these same drugs had already been linked to confusion or memory issues, the new evidence is deeply troubling. The researchers expressed concerns that if this association is causal, it “would equate, for example, to around 20,000 of the 209,600 new cases of dementia per year in the United Kingdom.” With the population of the US being 6 times larger, this could mean that over 100,000 cases of dementia may be attributed to these drugs every year here in my own country.
As part of this effort, I have come up with one alternative proposal which I discuss most extensively in a peer reviewed article published in a 2018 volume of the Journal of Humanistic Psychology (see 
The CSM approach begins with a full recognition that individuality outruns any classification system. It is for this reason that the CSM does not classify anyone. Instead, it classifies the expressed concerns of individuals seeking to have their concerns addressed by a mental health service provider. A mental health concern occurs when a person seeking mental health services expresses to a mental health service provider a concern about any of these topics: behavior, emotion, mood, meaning of life, death, dying, managing chronic pain, addiction, work, relationships, education, eating, cognition, sleep, and challenging life situations.
Classifying the expressed concern would provide mental health service providers a common language that is helpful when communicating among other professionals. So, a professional might say to a colleague something like, “My 9:00 a.m. case is concerned about feeling depressed, my 10:00 case is concerned about his failing grades, my 11:00 case is concerned about how anxious she is in social situations.” Such communications are straightforward and easy to understand, not only for professionals, but for the general public as well.
Each expressed concern listed in the CSM would be a sufficiently short phrase so that it can be conveniently used in titles and search engines to retrieve valued relevant information. Along with each classified expressed concern, there would be a numerical code that would be convenient for third-party payer bureaucratic record keeping.
This process involves a mental health service user and a mental health service provider co-constructing a hypothesis or “best guess” about the origins of the mental health service user’s concerns in the context of his or her relationships, social circumstances, cultural heritage, life events, and the sense that he or she has made of them. Once it has been established what the concerns are, the immediate next question is, “How do we jointly understand these experiences, why they arose, and how we might be able to address them?” This formulation is not something that is shared with third party payers of mental health services, but is utilized exclusively by the mental health service user and service provider.
With the CSM approach, no one is viewed as mentally ill, having a mental disorder, or having some psychopathological condition. Instead, it highlights that the progress of society is due to the fact that individuals naturally vary from the human average in all sorts of directions, that the originality is often useful, while, at the same time, being different can create a variety of concerns. Moreover, some people become concerned about how they are handling enormously stressful and traumatic experiences. Still others are living in unhealthy ways, such as making unhealthy choices in what they consume, or getting insufficient exercise. Mental health professionals, with the CSM approach, are viewed as seeking to address these types of concerns that arise from these conditions in a supportive setting while relying on a variety of wisdom traditions. Central to this approach, is an honoring of what Ralph Waldo Emerson referred to as the grand sweep of humanity.
Compared with the DSM/ICD approach, the use of the CSM would be less stigmatizing, more respectful to those seeking services, and more practical because of the ease of understanding the words and phrases that it utilizes. Moreover, it would be more consistent with principles of science because instead of using as its core concept the vaguely defined “mental disorders,” the CSM uses as its core concept “mental health concerns,” which is a clearly recognized event that occurs at a specific time and place. Finally, the CSM approach would provide a new choice to both mental health service users and providers, challenge old ideas, stimulate fresh perspectives, and open new avenues of research.
In an article titled, “What Might an Alternative to the DSM Suitable for Psychotherapists Look Like?” Jonathan D. Raskin notes that recent surveys of psychologists and counselors indicate they are dissatisfied with the DSM/ICD approach and are interested in coming up with alternatives better suited to their professions. Nevertheless, more that 90% said they will use the DSM/ICD; after all, that is how they get paid by third party payers.
In a commentary on Dr. Raskin’s article that appears in the same JHP issue, Rachel Cooper, a senior lecturer in philosophy at the United Kingdom’s University of Lancaster, and author of Diagnosing the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, puts in some of her own thoughts on this topic.
She begins by agreeing with Dr. Raskin that most psychologists and counselors would be keen for an alternative classification to be developed. She then reviewed research indicating that social workers should be included among the professionals unhappy with having to use the DSM/ICD approach. In surveys, most indicated they would not use it if it was not required for insurance purposes.
She then refers to my CSM approach, stating that I suggest that insurance companies could be persuaded to pay for “Mental Health Concerns,” as they would readily come to understand, with a little explaining, that mental health service providers now using the current DSM/ICD approach do not turn anyone away who has mental health insurance coverage and comes to their office expressing what the CSM refers to as a mental health concern. She then writes,
First of all, when Dr. Cooper says insurance companies usually try to prevent mental health providers from recording diagnoses to facilitate payment even in cases where a diagnosis criteria is not met, I strongly disagree with her. I’ve never in my entire career heard of an insurance company questioning a diagnosis, and on what basis could they possibly do so? Insurance funders are not present in the room when a so called diagnosis is made. All that they get as documentation for a given diagnosis is a code indicating the diagnosis.
Your insurance company requires that I must place a diagnosis on your health insurance form for you to access that service. I hear, so far, that you are concerned about….”
“Well, I wish we didn’t have to get into this labelling issue. Personally, I think it’s best to treat each person that I provide counseling to as an individual. It is understandable that many people don’t want to be placed in a diagnosis box, especially one known to be stigmatizing. But the insurance companies do require a diagnosis.”
In my journal article, I go on to propose a practical, more scientific alternative to the DSM. I call this alternative, the Classification and Statistical Manual of Mental Health Concerns (CSM). The first words in the CSM would be: “The developers of the CSM fully recognize that individuality outruns any classification system. It is for this reason that the CSM does not seek to classify anyone. Instead, it classifies the expressed concerns of individuals seeking to have their concerns addressed by a mental health service provider.”
On the other hand, some resisted the CSM approach. As I began to question them, seeking to figure out where exactly the disconnect was, I discovered that for some, it had to do with their belief that the DSM is a classification system based on solid principles of science and nothing could possibly be better. As I questioned them further, I discovered that their understanding of what a scientific classification system is designed to do was a bit incomplete. So, in today’s post, I explain in an easy to understand manner the nature of scientific classification systems, beginning with a description of a classification system with which we are all so very familiar–birds. This will enable us to see clearly why the bird classification system is useful as a scientific instrument. We will then look at the DSM classification system in light of what we learned about the bird system, and this will reveal the DSM‘s serious scientific shortcomings. Finally, we will compare and contrast the DSM system with the proposed CSM system in a manner that can make the superior scientific merits of the latter crystal clear.
As it turns out, there are some people very interested in birds.
Once scientists carefully define their general topic of interest, they describe different types of what they are interested in. So in our bird example, the scientist interested in them came up with a taxonomy that lists bluejays, pigeon, sparrow, and so forth as subtypes of the general category of birds, describing each subtype in a precise manner that can reliably distinguish each from the others on their list. Why bother to do this?
The main reason is that when they discuss their findings with others, they want to make sure they are using words that mean the same thing, and it is a great time saver. For example, let’s say John is a bird scientist and he says to Judy, another scientist, “I saw a bird the other day and I didn’t know what type it was; can you help me figure out what it is?” Notice that since both of these scientists know the meaning of a bird, it saves John quite a few words. Just imagine if instead every time John uses the word bird he had to say, “I saw something that had an endothermic vertebrae, characterized by feathers, toothless beaked jaws, the laying of hard-shelled eggs, a high metabolic rate, a four-chambered heart, and a strong yet lightweight skeleton.” That’s quite a mouthful to have to say each and every time you refer to a bird. In this example, just saying bird saves a scientist about 30 words each time the word bird is used.
And let’s say John, the scientist, wants to find in a library some information about a particular type of bird. He would have to waste time looking at every single book in his library until he found one that seemed to be talking about what he was interested in.
This would result in John having to unnecessarily wade through numerous books on flying insects, of which there are hundreds of thousands of types, bats, and some fish that sort of can fly. With the current bird classification system, anyone can go to a library and quickly find the specific section that houses information on just birds. Similarly, placing the word “bird” in a search engine enables John to more quickly retrieve relevant information than would a less explicit definition.
“In the DSM-IV, each of the mental disorders is conceptualized as a clinically significant behavioral or psychological syndrome or pattern that occurs in an individual and that is associated with present distress (e.g., a painful symptom) or disability (i.e., impairment in one or more important areas of functioning) or with a significant increase risk of suffering death, pain, disability, or an important loss of freedom.”
The latest edition of the DSM (DSM-5) is just as vague. It begins, “Although no definition can capture all aspects of all disorders in the range contained in the DSM-5, the following elements are required.” Although it says the following elements are required, it then makes it clear that the elements that it lists are not required. As I provide the rest of the definition, notice the use of the word “or” and “usually.”
“A mental disorder is a syndrome characterized by clinically significant disturbance in an individual’s cognitive, emotion regulation, or behavior that reflects a dysfunction in the psychological, biological, or developmental process underlying mental functioning. Mental disorders are usually associated with significant distress in social, occupational, or other important activities. An expected or culturally approved response to a common stressor or loss, such as the death of a loved one, is not a mental disorder. Socially deviant behavior (e.g., political, religious, or sexual) and conflicts that are primarily between the individual and society are not mental disorders unless the deviance or conflict results from a dysfunction in the individual, as described above.” 
This is about as vague a descriptor as one can possibly conjure up. How about the descriptor “dysfunction?” This, too, is left to the subjective opinion of mental health providers who often have financial interests in declaring that someone has a mental disorder.
I, for one, am interested in a phenomenon that I, and others, call mental health concerns. Obviously there is wide interest in this. After all, there are numerous educational institutions that provide training to people so they can become credentialed to address mental health concerns. Numerous people actually voluntarily go to these educational institutions, devoting considerable time and expense. Once completing the credentialing requirements, they apply to their state credentialing board, pay a fee, and then after the board checks to see if all of its requirements have been fulfilled, it grants a license permitting the person to legally provide mental health services. That person then sets up a practice that offers mental health services. People wishing to access these services first devote some time to decide where to go. They then make an appointment, show up for the appointment, and then express their mental health concern to the mental health service provider. Aspects of all of this occur each and everyday and involves tens of thousands of people working in a coordinated fashion to have mental health concerns addressed in a professional manner.
This definition of a mental health concern requires all of the following items for a mental health concern to exist:
Also notice that no one doubts that each of the 4 listed items that, taken together, make up the mental health concern concept exists. Everyone agrees that there are people who seek mental health services in our society. Everyone agrees there are people licensed to provide mental health services. If you go further down the list, there is no question whatsoever, that these other conditions also exist. So the definition, I contend, meets the scientific standard that it describes the something of interest (mental health concern) in a clear and detailed manner, leaving no room for confusion or doubt. Once the CSM classification system comes to be fully developed, people would be able to use the term “mental health concern” as a short way to indicate a phenomenon that contains all four of its defining characteristics.
With regards to the various types of concerns that mental health service providers are asked to address by those seeking their services, two major types would be, 1. concerns expressed about oneself, and 2. concerns expressed about someone else. Under the headings of each of these two major types would be concerns regarding behavior, emotion, mood, meaning of life, death, dying, managing chronic pain, addiction, work, relationships, education, eating, cognition, sleep, hearing voices others don’t hear, and challenging life situations. This, of course, is just a preliminary list of types, and through survey data that ask psychologists and mental health advocacy groups about the various mental health concerns that they are asked to address, the list would become more fully developed.
The above explanation was designed to clarify just one of the reasons why the proposed CSM’s mental health concern concept provides a far more solid scientific foundation on which to build a classification system than the DSM‘s mental disorder concept. Despite the fact that many people have become convinced that the DSM‘s classification system is a sound scientific instrument, its definition is far more vague than how I propose defining a mental health concern.
Well, in thinking about this, I hasten to mention that Thomas Kuhn’s (1972) classic book, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, rightly points out, for real change to occur in a branch of science, it is not enough to point out the weaknesses of a paradigm. There needs, as well, a new approach that is a distinct improvement over the old paradigm.
Regular readers know that I have, from time to time, been dealing with a conflict regarding psychiatric diagnosis. Said briefly, there are many people who immediately lose respect for anyone who questions the validity of the mental illness/mental disorder theoretical construct. On the other hand, many people have lost respect for the psychiatric profession because of its pathologizing approach of addressing concerns related to thinking, mood, behavior, or challenging life situations. Amidst this conflict, I have been trying to put forth on this blog, and in a number of other publishing outlets, an alternative approach with which the disputing parties can live in relative peace. 
Last year, I presented a paper on this topic at the American Psychological Association convention in Denver (see 
Albert Einstein created a revolution in the branch of science known as physics. Prior to the 20th century, physicists explained the propagation of light with the use of a theoretical construct known as the ether. There were experts in the ether who described ways to define it, along with its various characteristics. It was thought, for example, that the ether didn’t move in any direction, but it could vibrate. There was much discussion about an ether wind. And then Einstein came along and described the nature of light without resorting at all to the ether.
Criticism of the mental disorder construct began at the very beginning of American psychology when William James declared that it was nothing more than superficial medical talk. Criticism continued throughout the 20th century, and when the latest version of the DSM came out, there was a ton of media and professional articles that once again pointed out its numerous scientific shortcomings. Many throughout general psychology expressed deep concerns that psychologists utilizing the DSM approach had sold out to psychiatry and the pharmaceutical industry. Moreover, they bitterly complained that a paradigm that utilizes the mental disorder construct brings down respect for psychology as a legitimate branch of science. What can be done about this?
Well, in thinking about this I hasten to mention that Thomas Kuhn’s (1972) classic book, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, rightly points out, for real change to occur in a branch of science, it is not enough to point out the weaknesses of a paradigm, there needs, as well, a new approach that is a distinct improvement over the old paradigm. So, is it possible to really come up with a distinct improvement over the current DSM approach? I think our APA can do this easily if it set its mind to it, and it can do so within a year.
Let’s say Mary Doe comes to a licensed practicing psychologist and says she has been feeling a great deal of sadness much of her days. The psychologist, for verification purposes can say, “I hear you saying that you are concerned about how sad you have been feeling much of your days, and you would like us to work together to address this concern, is that correct?” If the service seeker says yes, this would verify that a mental health concern has been expressed, and what the concern is.
Well, there you have it. I only have seven minutes to present the paper, so many of the essential points that I would love to make have to be left out. There will be some time for questions and discussion, so some additional information could be shared then. And, for those who are interested, as I point out in my paper, they can now readily retrieve a far more complete presentation of my proposal by assessing the journal article I wrote that was just published last month.
At 39-years of age, Ron had been a respected employee in a department store for nearly ten years. If he had made it to ten full years, he would have qualified for some extra benefits. Upper management chose to replace him with someone new a week before the ten years were up. Discovering that landing a new job was leading to one rejection after another, Ron fell into an anguishing depression.
“You’ve been paying for mental health coverage on your health policy for over fifteen years. You might as well take advantage of it and see if a professional can help you through this.”
At his first appointment with Dr. Sigmund, a cigar smoking psychologist, Ron discovered that to access mental health services with his health policy, he would have to be labeled as a person with a mental disorder. “I don’t want that kind of nonsense in my medical record,” he told Dr. Sigmund. “I’m not mentally ill! I’m just going through some tough times right now and I can use some professional help getting through this.”
“Listen, Doctor, I’ve been paying for this mental health coverage for years and no one ever told me I had to be given a stigmatizing label to access services. That’s not fair.”
In fact we have recently learned that these disorders are properly viewed as genetic diseases. The evidence is pretty plain. We have learned that these types of conditions run in families, and genetic research has even identified the actual genes that are involved.”
First, Dr. Sigmund declares that “Without a mental disorder diagnosis, which I must place on the insurance form, I can’t see you.” This is pretty often true. In the United States, if you want to take advantage of your mental health insurance coverage, insurers require a mental disorder diagnosis [see 
In my opinion, it is not sound science that came up with these types of labels, but rather, a business model that serves the pharmaceutical industry and psychiatry. Psychologists have gone along with the plan for practical reasons. Additionally, some actually are convinced that the labeling system is indeed based on principles of science. For a full critique of their position, see 
In the parable, Dr. Sigmund declares that “these disorders are properly viewed as genetic diseases.” Is this a fair statement? The simple answer is no. To reasonably arrive at this answer, we’ll have to spend some time going step by step through some basic ideas.
Even identical twins won’t always have the same set of these types of characteristics despite the fact that a pair of identical twins have the same set of genes.
To understand why the answer is no, we have to first understand that all species have a great number of characteristics, and each of their characteristics vary to some extent between different members of their species. For example, human beings have a typical height, they can run at a typical speed, etc. The average height of male humans is about 5 feet, 9 inches. Some, men are, however, somewhat taller, others are somewhat shorter, and some are quite a bit taller or quite a bit shorter. Similarly, some men can run at the average speed for men, while others can run at various rates that are different from average.
If someone is above average in height, this does not mean he or she will be above average in running speed. Each of our numerous characteristics can be either within the average range, above average, or below, and because someone is below average in some set of characteristics does not mean that he or she will not have some characteristics that are average or even above average. And these differences are a great boom to the human race. If everyone was brilliant in academics and also had a strong genetic desire to be a professor at Ivy League universities, who would build the roads, drive our trucks, grow our crops, serve in law enforcement, cut our hair, tend to the sick, serve as fire fighters, staff stores, serve us in restaurants, etc.? People with different interests and talents enhance our own lives.
If you do end up shorter than average this does not mean you have a genetic disease, even if we can demonstrate that taller people tend to have some advantages over people who are shorter. Saying that people who are shorter than average have a dysfunction would be stigmatizing while clouding the fact that we cannot determine a person’s overall functioning based on just one set of characteristics. Being shorter, when combined with the rest of a person’s characteristics, can lead to him or her being more useful in a variety of ways.
Let’s move on now from discussing a person’s height to a more complex set of characteristics–athletic performance. There is some evidence that athletic performance might be a set of characteristics that, to some degree, 
Rather than pathologizing below average athletic skills, I’ve seen physical education teachers who encourage such children to participate in some after school programs that develop skills in sports that can be practiced non-competitively, such as running, bicycling, and golf. Some of these children take to such programs willingly and end up staying in fine physical shape the rest of their lives. If they don’t, they suffer the consequences and all of us end up paying higher health premiums because they are at an increased risk of getting sick. At the same time, their other sets of characteristics, when combined with their couch potato ways, may offer them and the rest of us some valued fruits.
I know that some psychologists say, it is only the sets of characteristics that can be linked in some way to a “dysfunction” that are properly labeled as a disease. But the dysfunctional descriptor is so vague that it can be applied to the vast majority of people, and, perhaps, everyone.
How about becoming a psychiatrist? This may run in the family. If we find that becoming a psychiatrist increases the likelihood of committing suicide, which some data suggests, are all of them to be viewed as having a genetic disease, or would it be clearer, and more scientific, to say their set of characteristics is a “risk factor” for some negative outcome? I believe the latter is more scientific.
Instead, psychologists have a conversation with the person seeking mental health services.
As I read the research on this issue, it became plain to see that genes can be likened to the buds of a beautiful flower. If they meet up with the right soil, sunlight, water, and care, they typically blossom into something beautiful. But even with a great deal of wonderful nourishment, sometimes they get tangled up with some surrounding weeds. Stigmatizing labels don’t help in such situations. Instead, some wise gardening can make a beautiful difference.
Dr. Kandel’s credentials are pretty impressive–he’s a Nobel Prize laureate and professor of brain science at Columbia University. Therefore, if you are among those who believe a person’s credentials should determine who is right and who is wrong, you need not read any further. You must simply conclude that what is referred to as mental illnesses are indeed brain diseases because you would be hard pressed to find someone with better credentials disagreeing with Dr. Kandel.
The argument that such labeling practices are not scientific, but, rather, value judgments, was intelligently made by William James when he defended the religious sentiment. He explained that pathologizing these sentiments as mental diseases was superficial medical talk. He called the reasoning doctors used to declare religious beliefs a type of mental illness, “medical materialism.”
assumes as a convenient hypothesis that the dependence of mental states on bodily conditions must be thoroughgoing and complete. If we adopt the assumption, then of course what medical materialism insists on must be true in a general way, if not every detail…. But now, I ask you, how can such an existential account of facts of mental history decide in one way or another on their spiritual significance? According to the general postulate of psychology just referred to, there is not a single one of our states of mind, high or low, healthy or morbid, that has not some organic process as its condition. Scientific theories are organically conditioned just as much as religious emotions are; and if we only knew the facts intimately enough, we should doubtless see “the liver” determining the dicta of the sturdy atheist as decisively as it does those of the Methodist under conviction anxious about his soul. When it alters one way the blood that percolates it, we get the Methodist, when in another way, we get the atheist form of mind. So of all our raptures and our drynesses, our longings and pantings, our questions and beliefs. They are equally organically founded, be they religious or of non-religious content.
All states of mind are related in extremely complex ways to neural functions. There is a crucial distinction to be made between a brain difference and a brain pathology. The significance of each state of mind must be tested, not by some neurological difference, but by the value of its fruits. When the term “pathological” is applied to an experience, rather than an identified physiological pathology, it wrongly implies a neutral science classification.
In contrast to biological arguments, 
Welcome to “From Insults to Respect.” Regular readers know that I have some serious objections to how mental health service providers treat those seeking their services. As things stand now, unless you can afford to completely pay for such services without any insurance coverage, to access services you are very likely to be required to be labelled as having a mental disorder.
First of all, I should note that I am a member of the American Psychological Association, and have been so for over forty years. Nevertheless, there is one particular aspect of the association that is deeply troubling to me.
As part of the psychological organization’s strong interest in science, pretty much anyone entering its approved doctoral psychology program is required to study the ideas of Thomas Kuhn’s thesis on The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Such revolutions, we learned, come about after a period of time when a field presupposes a conceptual and instrumental framework accepted without question. Then, more and more, members of the community begin to see a buildup of anomalies in the framework until a “crisis” which can no longer be resolved within the pre-established framework.
It just so happens that the psychiatrist’s stigmatizing diagnostic system, which is described in its Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders-Fifth Edition (DSM-5), has huge anomalies that have been recognized for years, and despite this, psychologists continue to utilize it without taking substantive steps to create a more scientific alternative. Let’s take a quick look at these anomalies. Afterwards, we’ll look at the benefits to psychologists that may be motivating it to continue to go along with the DSM-5 approach despite its major scientific weaknesses.
The process described in the DSM-5 for assessing the subjective notions of “disturbance” in the individual is left to the clinician who decides if these are “clinically significant.” Thus, it provides clinicians an opportunity to include anything that benefits their set of values.
All psychologists are taught that if a hypothetical construct, such as a mental disorder, is to have any validity, it must first demonstrate that it can be reliably identified. Upon reading the DSM-5, we find that there is no documentation that people, whether they are clinicians or not, can reliably distinguish between those who have mental disorders and those who do not have mental disorders. Thus, the lack of this documentation is analogous to a classification system of birds that has no documentation that people can reliably distinguish birds from non-birds.
The weakness [of the DSM] is its lack of validity. Unlike our definitions of ischemic heart disease, lymphoma, or AIDS, the DSM diagnoses are based on a consensus about clusters of clinical symptoms, not any objective laboratory measure. In the rest of medicine, this would be equivalent to creating diagnostic systems based on the nature of chest pain or the quality of fever. Indeed, symptom-based diagnosis, once common in other areas of medicine, has been largely replaced in the past half-century, as we have understood that symptoms alone rarely indicate the best choice of treatment.
In addition to the DSM’s shortcomings with regards to its classification system’s reliability and validity, there are also serious shortcomings with regards to its claim of being a diagnostic system. A diagnostic system speaks to etiology, that is, the cause, set of causes, or manner of causation of a disease or condition. But the DSM-5 specifically states that it is not designed to identify the cause of the various “disorders” it classifies. Then why use the term “diagnosis” rather than the more scientifically defensible term, “classification?” As we will see, this gets us back to our larger question, why does the psychologist organization accept the use of the DSM-5 given its problematic record of reliability and validity, as well as its use of the word “diagnosis” in a misleading, imprecise manner?
Moreover, symposium proposals on this issue are oftentimes accepted for presentations at its national convention. (See 
A well recognized usefulness of the DSM-5 is that by using its medical sounding terms to refer to all of the experiences that this approach classifies as “mental disorders” it legitimizes in the minds of many the prescribing of drugs for these experiences.
Now keep in mind that the psychiatric association membership consists largely of psychiatrists who make their living by prescribing these drugs. Moreover, there are several reports indicating that the majority of the major players who developed the DSM-5 were on the payroll of the pharmaceutical industry. So, it makes sense to theorize that the psychiatric organization may very well be influenced by all of this wealth. But what about the psychological association?