In an article titled “The Roots of Mental Illness,” the author, Kirsten Weir, tells us about Eric Kandel, MD, who believes that the experiences that doctors refer to as mental illnesses are brain diseases. Dr. Kandel defends his belief with the following statement: “All mental processes are brain processes, and therefore all disorders of mental functioning are biological diseases. The brain is the organ of the mind.”
The article also indicates that Dr. Kandel believes one important value of recognizing that these types of experiences are brain diseases is that it helps minimize the shame often associated with them. For example, Dr. Kandel is quoted as saying, “Schizophrenia is a disease like pneumonia. Seeing it as a brain disorder destigmatizes it immediately.”
Dr. Kandel’s credentials are pretty impressive–he’s a Nobel Prize laureate and professor of brain science at Columbia University. Therefore, if you are among those who believe a person’s credentials should determine who is right and who is wrong, you need not read any further. You must simply conclude that what is referred to as mental illnesses are indeed brain diseases because you would be hard pressed to find someone with better credentials disagreeing with Dr. Kandel.
However, if you are among those of us who believe that regardless of someone’s credentials, the reasonableness of the argument should sway your judgments, then I encourage you to read on. In brief, you will find that the phrase, “disorders of mental functioning” is way too vague for a science of disease, and that Dr. Kandel’s conclusion that seeing these types of experiences as brain diseases immediately destigmatizes it, is at the very least, questionable.
Are Disorders of Mental Functioning Properly Viewed as Brain Diseases?
Colony of pathogen bacterias
Physical pathologists, who are trained in the principles of science, determine if a pathological condition is present by looking for a set of objectively observable body conditions such as tumors, microbe infections, tissue tears, bone fractures, and blocked arteries. None of these have been identified by pathologists as causing the conditions typically labelled by psychiatrists as mental illnesses. If they were to find the physical pathology that causes any of the behavior patterns referred to as mental illnesses, that pattern would no longer be referred to as a mental illness. Instead, the pattern would be viewed as the symptoms of the physical pathology, and the disease would be referred to either as the type of pathology (tumor, microbe infection, etc.) or the name of the person who discovered the relationship between the behavior pattern and the physical pathology.
Dr. Kandel, when trying to make the case that mental illnesses are real brain diseases has, at times, cited articles that show some correlation of a brain difference with some of the concerns that lead to a mental illness label. But these correlations are far too weak to demonstrate they are causing these types of concerns. For example, people labeled as having schizophrenia have, on average, some larger brain ventricles. However, there are many people who have the same size ventricles, or even larger ones, who show no signs of schizophrenia. Moreover, numerous people who have smaller than average size ventricles are regularly classified as having schizophrenia. Thus, quite clearly, it is not the size of the ventricles that are causing the schizophrenic behavior pattern. It is for this reason that the size of one’s brain ventricles is not used to make the so called diagnosis of schizophrenia. Instead, doctors rely on a conversation with the designated patient to make these types of so called diagnoses.
Are such conversations properly viewed as objective criteria for determining a disease state and equivalent to observing the type of pathologies that physical pathologists look for in identifying a disease state? Numerous critics of psychiatry say no. They point to what highly credentialed doctors have, over the course of history, claimed are mental illnesses.
Dr. Samuel Cartwright
For example, in 1851 American physician Samuel A. Cartwright labelled black slaves who tried to flee captivity as having the mental illness of drapetomania. For people who hold the value judgment that the function of healthy blacks is to be slaves, then it certainly makes sense to say that blacks seeking to flee captivity were being dysfunctional.
Freud Practicing the Dysfunctional Habit of Smoking
If you are religious, many highly credentialed medical doctors, including Sigmund Freud, who, like Dr. Kandel, won a Nobel Prize, have claimed this meant you had a mental illness. People who are gay were declared as having a mental disease here in the US. In the former Soviet Union, if you were opposed to communism it warranted a mental illness label by their psychiatrists. In each of these societies, a case was made that the behavior pattern labelled as a mental illness was dysfunctional.
The argument that such labeling practices are not scientific, but, rather, value judgments, was intelligently made by William James when he defended the religious sentiment. He explained that pathologizing these sentiments as mental diseases was superficial medical talk. He called the reasoning doctors used to declare religious beliefs a type of mental illness, “medical materialism.”
Medical materialism seems indeed a good appellation for the too simple-minded system of thought which we are considering. Medical materialism finishes up Saint Paul by calling his vision on the road to Damascus a discharging lesion of the occipital cortex, he being an epileptic.
Woman of Religious Faith
It snuffs out Saint Teresa as an hysteric, Saint Francis of Assisi as an hereditary degenerate. George Fox’s discontent with the shams of his age, and his pining for spiritual veracity, it treats as a symptom of a disordered colon. Carlyle’s organ-tones of misery it accounts for by a gastro-duodenal catarrh. All such mental overtensions, it says, are, when you come to the bottom of the matter, mere affairs of diathesis (auto-intoxications most probably), due to the perverted action of various glands which physiology will yet discover.
James goes on from here to point out that it is true, of course, that psychology has found that there are definite psychophysical connections that “hold good.” Psychology, therefore:
assumes as a convenient hypothesis that the dependence of mental states on bodily conditions must be thoroughgoing and complete. If we adopt the assumption, then of course what medical materialism insists on must be true in a general way, if not every detail…. But now, I ask you, how can such an existential account of facts of mental history decide in one way or another on their spiritual significance? According to the general postulate of psychology just referred to, there is not a single one of our states of mind, high or low, healthy or morbid, that has not some organic process as its condition. Scientific theories are organically conditioned just as much as religious emotions are; and if we only knew the facts intimatelyenough, we should doubtless see “the liver” determining the dicta of the sturdy atheist as decisively as it does those of the Methodist under conviction anxious about his soul. When it alters one way the blood that percolates it, we get the Methodist, when in another way, we get the atheist form of mind. So of all our raptures and our drynesses, our longings and pantings, our questions and beliefs. They are equally organically founded, be they religious or of non-religious content.
James points out that in the natural sciences it never occurs to anyone to refute opinions by putting down their authors’ neurological constitutions. Value is determined by “judgments based on our own immediate feelings primarily; and secondarily on what we can ascertain of their experiential relations to our moral needs and to the rest of what we hold as true.”
All states of mind are related in extremely complex ways to neural functions. There is a crucial distinction to be made between a brain difference and a brain pathology. The significance of each state of mind must be tested, not by some neurological difference, but by the value of its fruits. When the term “pathological” is applied to an experience, rather than an identified physiological pathology, it wrongly implies a neutral science classification.
In my view, what William James says about the religious sentiment and disease states hold just as true for people who are currently declared as having a mental illness by Dr. Kandel and many other doctors. They declare, in a very subjective manner, patterns of behavior are due to a brain disease without objective proof that there is a physical pathological condition causing the pattern. They don’t make a distinction between a brain difference and a brain disease. And they don’t deal effectively with the fact that there are numerous people who display patterns that have been viewed by the psychopathologizing doctors who have brought forth some of the greatest fruits known to the human race.
Calling Mental Illness a Brain Disease: Does It Stop Stigma?
In the above Aldous Huxley quote, apparently it was his opinion that all the normal people in our society are dysfunctional, and thus psychiatry might want to declare all normal people as having a brain disease. I wonder if all normal people might feel less stigmatized upon hearing about this pathologizing of their experiences. Hmmm.
Anyway, if you will, let us turn to Dr. Kandel’s declaration that by getting people to see that mental illnesses are brain diseases it destigmatizes them immediately. He offered no scientific evidence for this. When we actually look at the evidence bearing on his statement, we get a very different impression.
Lincoln, sufferer of depression
Very modest evidence exists indicating people who have become convinced that mental illnesses are brain diseases are somewhat less likely to blame labeled persons for their behavior. However, at the same time, overall stigma actually increases. Biological explanations, for many, imply that people with mental illness are fundamentally different or less human.
Research has also shown, that disease explanations for mental illness provoked harsher behavior toward labeled persons. It is worthwhile keeping in mind that in the not-so-distant past, biological and genetic explanations for stigmatized conditions were linked to a range of harsh policies, including marriage restrictions, sterilization, lobotomies, and even extermination.
Painter who has been said to suffer from mental illness
The biological explanation may also exacerbate yet another key stereotype of mental illness, the belief that people with mental illness are dangerous. Many researchers believe that the stereotype that people with mental illness are violent ranks among the most prejudicial and discriminating of attitudes. Unfortunately, there is evidence that biological arguments may actually strengthen dangerousness stereotypes, suggesting that people with mental illness have no control over their behavior and therefore are unpredictable and violent.
In contrast to biological arguments, psychosocial explanations of mental health concerns have been found to effectively improve images of people who are now being labeled as having a mental illness. It also appears to reduce fear.
Instead of arguing that mental illness is like any other medical illness, psychosocial explanations of mental health concerns focus on environmental stressors and trauma as causal factors. These may include childhood abuse, poverty, and job stress. The idea is to reframe mental health concerns as understandable reactions to life events.
Conclusion
Socrates heard voices in his head that he referred to as guiding demons and was condemned to death by society leaders.
The mental health concerns that most modern day doctors refer to as mental illnesses, have not been shown to be caused by a physiological pathological condition. There are undoubtedly some brain differences that have been correlated with a few types of concerns, but it is way too simplistic to say that such differences are the cause of any of these concerns. It is very possible that environmental and cultural factors may lead to the observed correlations. Despite the fact that a person might be said by some that he or she is functioning below average in some ways under some societal situation, numerous examples can be easily provided that people labeled mentally ill have often produced valued fruits in the fields of science, arts, and philosophy. Finally, labeling someone experiencing a mental health concern as having a brain disease does not automatically decrease stigma, and could actually increase it.
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Some people will enjoy reading this blog by beginning with the first post and then moving forward to the next more recent one; then to the next one; and so on. This permits readers to catch up on some ideas that were presented earlier and to move through all of the ideas in a systematic fashion to develop their emotional intelligence. To begin at the very first post you can click HERE.
“Good morning, Barbara,” I say, as my first counseling case walks into my office. I notice she looks a little angry. Upon sitting down, she declares, “I’m terribly frustrated. I’ve been depressed now for over two weeks, and I just can’t shake it!”
It’s easy for me to empathize because I regularly have bouts of what I refer to as melancholy. A deep anguish comes over me, and during this period I often begin to think about how I went through my father’s death when I was twelve, how I’m getting older and can no longer do the many athletic things that thrilled me when I was younger, and on and on. Sometimes these dark melancholy experiences come about because something clearly happened that upset me, and sometimes they seem to come out of the blue.
Beyond Listening in a Caring Manner
After listening in a caring way to Barbara for a few minutes, I ask her if something specifically happened that led her into her current emotional experience. Then I explore with her a question about how often she has these experiences and if she feels she has them more frequently than most people, about as often as most, or less than most. Then, I ask her about how she has been functioning in other areas of her life–sleep, eating, exercise, interpersonal relationships, work/school, household responsibilities.
You see, as people experience depression, or other concerns that often lead to a classification of having a mental disorder, some people go about their lives functioning as they typically were doing before the concern arose, while some find that in some areas they begin to function below the levels that are typical for them, while some find that their functioning increases in one or more areas. For example, some sleep about the same amount, some less, and some more. I have met people who, when they are depressed, start cleaning every inch of their home, while others find it difficult to get out of bed.
Also of interest when exploring a person’s expressed concern is to look at how the person had been functioning before the onset of the presenting concern. If some important relationships had begun to function below average, or if the person had been sleeping less than average to keep up with work demands, these facts can be insightful when seeking ways to address the presenting concern.
Now, once I found out what Barbara was concerned about, what might have precipitated the concern, and how she had been functioning in various areas of her life, I had a pretty good idea as to how to proceed in addressing her concern. I had no need to decide whether or not she had a mental disorder. However, many mental health practitioners are required to declare that the person seeking mental health services has a mental disorder if they want to get paid. Is this mental illness labeling really necessary?
Mental Illness Labeling Versus an Addressing Concern Approach
There are those who embrace this mental illness/disorder labeling. One reason is the pharmaceutical industry’s promotion of this idea to sell people on the idea that they need certain drugs to live a more normal, healthier life.
Beyond that, another major reason for this is that these individuals have a group of people in their lives that blame them for the way that they have been feeling or acting. When a doctor has declared, for example, that John Smith has a mental disorder, he may feel vindicated. “You see, there really is something wrong with me!” he may cry out in his defense.
In actuality, those who are doing the blaming may continue their blaming despite the doctor’s opinion. Moreover, many of us don’t blame people whenever they find some concern has arisen in their lives even if they are going through a non-illness experience. I know I’m not blaming myself when I experience melancholy, and I was not at all blaming Barbara for what she was going through.
Those who are uncomfortable about the use of “mental illness” terminology point out they are stigmatizing because they are used as put downs in our society. Moreover, the media associates the most heinous crimes with those referred to as the mentally ill even though the vast majority of those classified in this manner are not violent.
Among the most articulate individuals to voice objections to the mental disorder labeling was Harvard psychologist and philosopher William James. Over one hundred years ago he wrote a book titled, The Varieties of Religious Experience (1902). At that time many medical doctors argued that people who were religious were all mentally ill. In response, Professor James wrote:
Medical materialism seems indeed a good appellation for the too simple-mindedsystem of thought which we are considering. Medical materialism finishesup Saint Paul by calling his vision on the road to Damascus a discharginglesion of the occipital cortex, he being an epileptic.
Girl (6-8) praying, profile, close-up
It snuffs out Saint Teresa as an hysteric, Saint Francis of Assisi as an hereditary degenerate.George Fox’s discontent with the shams of his age, and his pining for spiritualveracity, it treats as a symptom of a disordered colon. Carlyle’s organ-tonesof misery it accounts for by a gastro-duodenal catarrh. All such mentalovertensions, it says, are, when you come to the bottom of the matter,mere affairs of diathesis (auto-intoxications most probably), due to theperverted action of various glands which physiology will yet discover.(p. 29)
James goes on from here to point out that it is true, of course, that psychology has found that there are definite psycho-physical connections that “hold good” (p. 30). Psychology, therefore:
assumes as a convenient hypothesis that the dependence of mental stateson bodily conditions must be thoroughgoing and complete. If we adopt theassumption, then of course what medical materialism insists on must betrue in a general way, if not every detail…. But now, I ask you, howcan such an existential account of facts of mental history decide in oneway or another on their spiritual significance? According to the generalpostulate of psychology just referred to, there is not a single one ofour states of mind, high or low, healthy or morbid, that has not some organic process as its condition. Scientific theories are organically conditionedjust as much as religious emotions are; and if we only knew the facts intimatelyenough, we should doubtless see “the liver” determining the dicta of thesturdy atheist as decisively as it does those of the Methodist under convictionanxious about his soul. When it alters one way the blood that percolatesit, we get the Methodist, when in another way, we get the atheist formof mind. So of all our raptures and our drynesses, our longings and pantings,our questions and beliefs. They are equally organically founded, be theyreligious or of non-religious content. (p. 30)
James points out that in the natural sciences and the arts it never occurs to anyone to refute opinions, beliefs and experiences by putting down their author’s neurological constitution. Value is determined by “judgments based on our own immediate feelings primarily; and secondarily on what we can ascertain of their experiential relations to our moral needs and to the rest of what we hold as true” (p. 33).
James was additionally concerned that medical materialism greatly overgeneralizes its knowledge of the connections between physiological variables and mind states. In James’s day, the pathology writers would take the few psychophysical correlations that they obtained under highly specialized conditions and then vaguely generalize their findings to discredit, to their satisfaction, all of the states of mind that they disliked.
The Modern Day View
Now, modern day psychiatrists sometimes respond,
“Well, certainly in James’s day we indeed knew almost nothing about such matters, but today our knowledge has vastly increased! Thus, James’s position is no longervalid because we can now make sound statements about the connections betweenphysiological states and mind states.”
To this, I respond that in point of fact there is currently a renewed respect for the extraordinary complexity
that exists during the integration process between mind, physiology, behavior, and environmental variables. Whereas it is true that there have been large gains in our knowledge, these gains are best likened to moving from a few drops of knowledge to a glass almost full; yet, to really understand the integration process, we would need oceans and oceans of knowledge. Trillions and trillions of interactions are involved.
It is for these reasons that the mental illness/disorder terminology is misleading. As Dr. Thomas Insel, the former director of the National Institute of Mental Health, recently said about the psychiatric labeling process known as the DSM.
The weakness [of the DSM] is its lack of validity. Unlike our definitions of ischemic heart disease, lymphoma, or AIDS, the DSM diagnoses are based on a consensus about clusters of clinical symptoms, not any objective laboratory measure. In the rest of medicine, this would be equivalent to creating diagnostic systems based on the nature of chest pain or the quality of fever. Indeed, symptom-based diagnosis, once common in other areas of medicine, has been largely replaced in the past half-century as we have understood that symptoms alone rarely indicate the best choice of treatment.
To hear and view other leading scientists further make this point, I highly recommend the following free video:
When individuals express a concern, exploring how they are functioning in the main areas of their life can be enormously helpful. Someone who reports a concern about experiencing depression, whom, by some gentle questioning, we find out has been functioning below average in the areas of sleep, interpersonal relationships, and exercise may benefit enormously if we work together on getting these areas of functioning in a more optimal range. This is true for those who report other types of concerns such as experiencing anxiety, hearing voices, below average range of attention, obsessive thoughts, and on and on. With a model that includes addressing concerns and exploring ways to improve functioning, labeling someone as having a mental disorder becomes unnecessary and may actually interfere with the aims of a counseling/psychotheraputic relationship.
For those who desire, for whatever reason, to be labeled as having a mental disorder, I am not proposing that we interfere with this. But for those who desire to have their concerns addressed by well trained mental health professionals without being referred to as having a mental illness or disorder, I do propose that we do provide a reasonable option for them to access mental health services. In my view, mental health professionals, once we hear our clients’ concerns and how they are functioning in the various areas of their lives, we have the basics to formulate, in full cooperation with our clients, a plan for addressing these concerns. I hope you give this some thought.
For those of you who would like to learn more about how an addressing concern approach would work and be consistent with science if adopted by mental health providers, you can access my peer reviewed article for free by clicking HERE.
Until next week, may you find some kindness out there in this fascinating world of ours.
My Best,
Jeff
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Some people will enjoy reading this blog by beginning with the first post and then moving forward to the next more recent one; then to the next one; and so on. This permits readers to catch up on some ideas that were presented earlier and to move through all of the ideas in a systematic fashion to develop their emotional intelligence. To begin at the very first post you can click HERE.
On August 8, 2015, I spoke at the American Psychological Association’s annual convention that was held in Toronto, Canada. My speech was part of a two hour symposium titled: “Beyond the DSM–Current Trends in Devising New Diagnostic Alternatives.” The DSM’s letters stand for the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders. It is currently used by most mental health professionals to classify people seeking mental health services.
When the latest version of this manual came out, it was widely criticized. Consequently, a group of psychologists began to work together to think about possible alternatives. Several members of that group spoke at this symposium.
My Speech
Of late, I have been discussing today’s symposium theme with quite a few people. I have found that supporters of the DSM say that it is a classification system that has been helpful because it provides a common language for mental health professionals to communicate about those utilizing their services; its various diagnostic terms, such as Major Depressive Disorder, Anxiety Disorder, etc., are short phrases that are convenient for placing them into article titles, book titles, and search engines to retrieve valued relevant information; third party payers of mental health services have found that the DSM coding system works well as part of a practical method for their record keeping; with the aid of these codes, people do manage to access mental health services, mental health service providers do manage to get paid, and for-profit health companies do tend to make a profit.
So, from my discussions, those are the basic reasons supporters of the DSM say that it is useful. Actually, there is another usefulness of the DSM that, interestingly, I never hear supporters of the DSM mention, and yet critics of the DSM often mention. That usefulness is this: by using medical sounding terms to refer to all of the experiences that the DSM classifies as “mental disorders” it legitimizes in the minds of many the prescribing of drugs for these experiences.
There is an enormous amount of money being made from this approach because it takes less than a penny to manufacture each pill, and it can be sold for more than one thousand times that amount. With so much money being generated from this enterprise, the drug companies have managed to make it clear to powerful groups that what benefits the drug companies also benefits them. Examples are, major media outlets gain enormous revenues from drug company advertisements, and political campaigns get substantial support from the industry.
So this benefit is in a sense the elephant in the room. I fully see it, but nevertheless, I want to move it off to the side of the room for now, and ask you all to briefly ignore it. After I complete my main ideas, I’ll return to the elephant in my concluding remarks.
Keeping in mind just the usefulness of the DSM that its supporters tend to mention, it seems to me that if we are to have any hope that an alternative to the DSM might be widely adopted, we would have to be able to make an excellent case that the alternative would be just as helpful while, at the same time, have significantly less shortcomings.
What are these shortcomings? Well, in brief, critics of the DSM have expressed concerns that it tends to be stigmatizing to mental health service users; the DSM also simplistically devalues all of the experiences that it classifies as mental disorders despite the fact that there are a great number of people who have testified that having gone through these very types of experiences it brought forth valued fruits.
Leo Tolstoy
For example, Leo Tolstoy reported in his biography, My Confession, that by going through a period of suicidal depression, it led to one valued insight after another.
Joni Mitchell
As another example, the fine song writer, Joni Mitchell apparently went through, during her life, a number of very challenging emotional experiences that first received the full DSM psychopathologizing treatment. In time, her perspective changed, and at one point she expressed her new perspective in a song titled, “Hejira.” She wrote, “There’s comfort in melancholy where there is no need to explain, it’s just as natural as the weather in this moody sky today.” Thus, for many, the framing of their experiences as mental disorders dramatically misses the mark; critics of the DSM also point out that it violates basic principles of science because of its vaguely defined constructs and thus low inter-rater reliability; the DSM also violates basic principles of humanistic psychology; and within the mental health field the DSM is a monopoly, with all of the drawbacks associated with such an organizational situation.
So, those are, in brief, the DSM shortcomings. Keeping them in mind along with its perceived benefits, is it possible to come up with an alternative that indeed does achieve all of the benefits that the DSM supporters claim for it, while, at the same time, has far fewer shortcomings? Well, for your consideration, I offer you the Classification and Statistical Manual of Mental Health Concerns, or, for short, the CSM. Not the DSM, but the CSM! Let’s look at what each chapter would contain.
Chapter 1
The first chapter would begin by stating that the developers of the CSM fully recognize that individuality outruns any classification system. It is for this reason that the CSM does not seek to classify anyone. Instead, it classifies the expressed concerns of individuals seeking to have their concerns addressed by a mental health service provider.
This first chapter would go on from here to explain that the CSM begins from the perspective of the person seeking services. Because the expression of a mental health concern is a clearly observable event that occurs at a specific time and place, by making it the event being classified in the CSM it solves the reliability problems that have been plaguing the DSM’s far more abstract concept of “mental disorders.”
After this statement, the CSM would clearly define its main construct:
A mental health concern occurs when a person seeking mental health services expresses to a mental health service provider a concern about any of these topics: behavior, emotion, mood, addictions, meaning of life, death, dying, managing chronic pain, work, relationships, education, eating, cognition, sleep, and challenging life situation.
So, those are the basic ingredients of Chapter 1.
Chapter 2
Chapter 2 would begin by explaining that the CSM has two classes of expressed concerns–Concerns expressed about oneself, and concerns expressed about someone else. An example of the first class is, Sally is seeking mental health services and expresses a concern to a mental health service provider that she has been experiencing a great deal of anxiety when she enters social situations. An example of the second class is Bob, a father, upon seeking counseling for his son, expresses a concern about his child’s behavior.
Each of these two classes of concerns would have under each of its headings a list of specific concerns, along with an assigned code to be used for third-party payer record keeping.
So, let’s quickly return to the example of Sally expressing a concern that she has been experiencing a great deal of anxiety in social situations. This would be referred to, for classification purposes, as a “social situation anxiety” concern. Notice that “social situation anxiety” is just three words, thus it is short enough to be used in article titles, book titles and search engines.
Each of the actual expressed concerns would be just as useful as the DSM terms for providing those in the mental health profession a common language for communication about those utilizing their services.
In this chapter 2, it would be explained how the creators of the CSM identified the list of concerns included in the CSM. These concerns would be identified by a survey of a sample of mental health service providers. Those filling out the survey would first read the definition of a mental health concern. Then they would list, in order of frequency, the various concerns that they had been asked to address in their practice over the course of the previous year. At the back of the CSM would be a summary of the findings of this survey and its related statistics.
Moving on to Chapter 3
As noted, the previous chapter would be designed to provide the method for identifying and coding a set of brief mental health concern descriptors suitable for a number of practical purposes. Once this is achieved the CSM then provides a method to develop a lengthier psychological formulation approach that is designed to fill in additional details about the expressed concern. Thus, Chapter 3 of the CSM would be devoted to describing good practice guidelines for the use of a type of psychological formulation that is consistent with the CSM’s philosophy of not psychopathologizing individuals. This type of psychological formulation provides an approach that expands on the brief expressed concerns of individuals by developing a narrative of several paragraphs. It can be defined as the process involving a mental health service user and a mental health service provider co-constructing a hypothesis or ‘best guess’ about the origins of the mental health service user’s concerns in the context of his or her strengths, relationships, social circumstances, cultural heritage, life events, and the sense that he or she has made of them.
Defending the CSM
Okay, these are the basic chapters of the CSM. Now let’s quickly recall that supporters of the DSM believe that it is a classification system that is useful because it provides a common language for mental health professionals to communicate with one another. I hope from what I have already said, that you can plainly see that the CSM would provide an alternative plain, humane language that would be just as practical as the DSM. But let’s look a little more closely at this via an example.
When I was doing my practicum at the University of Minnesota’s Counseling Center, I worked there for a whole year and we had no need to use the “mental disorder” jargon of the DSM to communicate. When my advisor asked me to quickly tell him about my morning cases, I would reply with words like, “My 9:00 a.m. case is concerned about feeling depressed, my 10:00 case is concerned about his failing grades, my 11:00 case is concerned about how anxious she is in social situations. If my advisor wanted to know more about a case, we went into the psychological formulation type of information. Communication flowed easily. This is how the CSM would work in practice.
The idea that the DSM’s coding system is a practical approach for third party payers’ record keeping is an essential point made by DSM supporters. With the following description, I think you will readily see that the CSM approach is just as practical.
Third party payer systems have a form that must be filled out whenever someone seeks mental health services under their plan. This form has a little box that currently says, “Diagnosis.” In that box, mental health professionals are required to fill in the DSM code that corresponds to their so-called diagnosis of the person seeking services.
With the CSM proposal, all that we would be asking third-party payer institutions to do differently in order to add value for their customers, is to slightly change that little box. Instead of just saying “Diagnosis” as it currently says, that box would add two simple words, so it would end up saying “Diagnosis or Concern.” Then, when mental health professionals fill in the box, they would be given the choice to either write in the letters “DSM-5” and its code number that corresponds to its so-called diagnosis, or they would write the letters CSM and its code number that corresponds to the expressed concern.
With the creation of the CSM, not only will mental health providers have a new option to choose from, but so too will mental health consumers. They would be given the choice to go to psychopathologizing mental health service providers or those using the CSM approach.
So, for third party payers, that’s all the change that would be required in order to increase value for a significant number of mental health providers and service users. And a major goal that all third-party payers have is to increase value for their customers. The cost and effort for adding this new option for these payers would be minimum.
Conclusion
In conclusion, the creation of the CSM would improve value for consumers of mental health services. It would provide a practical approach that offers a new choice for those mental health service users and providers who are dissatisfied with the DSM. It does so in a manner that is more scientific and humanistic. Moreover, the creation of the CSM would break up the DSM monopoly.
Now, let’s return to the elephant in the room. Let’s bring it forth, front and center.
Yes, the DSM’s medical jargon has an enormous benefit to the pharmaceutical industry. However, with the creation of the CSM, the elephant would still get fed. Those who prefer the DSM to the CSM would be able to continue to use it. The pharmaceutical industry will still be able to promote the drugs with images of a patient looking miserable and family members distraught, all in grey, black and white, followed by images of the same patient taking a pill, now smiling in vibrant living color, with the sun shining, and family members gathered around, and bouquets of flowers brightening the whole world. There will be plenty of people who will still seek to have their concerns washed away with the ease of swallowing a pill.
Despite drug companies being able to still make a great deal of money even if the CSM was to become widely adopted, no doubt the industry as a whole would still seek to try with all its might to maintain the monopoly it currently enjoys. No doubt, big money can be very influential in putting a stop to competition. I get that. But to help us to think a little more clearly about this, let’s use a metaphor fitting to our country’s current enormous interest in the presidential primary campaigns.
You all know about the discussions going on about how a few billionaires has so much influence on who will get to win. There is much truth to this concern, but I ask you to keep in mind that every now and then, a dark horse comes along that does manage to win despite all of the big money that went to supporting the favorite of the super-rich.
In my view, the CSM has the potential to be that type of dark horse. I’m hoping that this is so because there exists enough psychologists out there who are willing to roll up their sleeves and get down to do the necessary work of joining their efforts with those of other allied professionals and mental health consumer advocacy groups because they believe this is in the best interest of those they seek to serve.
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Some people will enjoy reading this blog by beginning with the first post and then moving forward to the next more recent one; then to the next one; and so on. This permits readers to catch up on some ideas that were presented earlier and to move through all of the ideas in a systematic fashion to develop their emotional intelligence. To begin at the very first post you can click HERE.
In recent weeks, I have been providing a series of blog posts on psychiatric name calling (see here, here, here, and here). In these posts, I have expressed some negative opinions about the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM).
The DSM provides the names for the various mental health concerns that mental health service providers are often required to use if they want to be paid for their services or if they want to have their research published in professional journals.The language of the DSM places its terminology under the umbrella concepts of “mental illness,” “mental disorder,” and “psychopathology.” In my blog series, I have argued that the pathologizing of human experiences in this way does far more harm than good.
As part of my discussions on this topic, I quoted the opinions of some who agreed, and some who disagreed, with my opinions. The quotes that I used were selected from my own personal readings. Therefore, they may not have been characteristic of how a wider range of different people may think and feel about the DSM approach to labeling the various mental health concerns.
A few years ago, two teams of researchers have sought to obtain a broader range of views on this topic by carrying out surveys. Jonathan D. Raskin and Michael C. Gayle surveyed psychologists who regularly use the DSM, and published their findings in the Journal of Humanistic Psychology (DSM-5: Do Psychologists Really Want an Alternative? 2015, pages 1-18). Lois Holzman and her team surveyed people in some New York City communities, and published her findings on the DxSummit.org website (A Report on Community Outreach: Lay Opinions on Emotional Distress and Diagnosis, http://dxsummit.org/archives/2249). Let’s take a look at their findings.
What the Psychologists Had to Say
Here’s a summary of the survey data by Jonathan D. Raskin and Michael C. Gayle:
Only two published studies, both from the early 1980s, have specifically examined psychologist attitudes toward the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM). The current article rectifies this by presenting the results of a recent survey of attitudes toward the DSM-IV-TR and DSM-5. Though the DSM has changed over the years, psychologist attitudes toward it have remained remarkably consistent. Although more than 90% of psychologists report using the DSM, they are dissatisfied with numerous aspects of it and support developing alternatives to it—something that psychologists over 30 years ago supported, as well. The finding that almost all psychologists use the DSM despite serious concerns about it raises ethical issues because professionals are ethically bound to only use instruments in which they are scientifically confident.
In the above summary, the number 5 after the letters DSM, refers to the fact that the DSM has undergone five major revisions. Since the 1980s, there have been three such revisions. Ideally, users of the DSM would see clear improvement for each revision.
When a survey was done in the early 1980s, psychologists were clearly skeptical of the DSM-2. As described by Raskin and Gayle,
More than 40% felt it (a) distorted clinician perceptions of clients, (b) applied medical labels to psychosocial problems, (c) was not reliable and valid, (d) emphasized diagnosis over treatment, (e) obscured individual differences, and (f) overemphasized pathology. Almost 60% were dissatisfied or somewhat dissatisfied with the DSM-2 with only 17% satisfied or somewhat satisfied.
When the DSM-3 came out in 1983, Smith and Kraft carried out an updated survey on this revision of the DSM-2. The findings indicated that psychologists at that time (a) preferred social–interpersonal diagnosis, nondiagnosis, and behavioral analysis over DSM-3—in that order; (b) felt that most conditions in DSM-3 were best seen as nonmedical problems in living; (c) believed too little had been done to develop scientific alternatives to the DSM; and (d) thought that client welfare and integrity would be better served by abandoning the medical model. Eighty-five percent disagreed that mental disorders are a subset of medical disorders.
In the latest survey that was carried out by Raskin and Gayle, 128 anonymous psychologists participated. Among the questions that were asked was, “How satisfied are you with the changes being proposed for DSM-5?” Their answers indicated that they were significantly more negative about it than neutral. The general attitude about the latest version of the DSM were very similar to what was found three decades ago, namely, that a significant number of psychologists are unhappy with the DSM.
What Community Folks Had to Say
In the community outreach survey of lay opinions on emotional distress and diagnosis carried out by Lois Holzman and her colleagues, people were asked questions at two annual NYC street fairs attended by millions of people. Conversations lasted from five to over ten minutes each. In all, 143 people participated in the survey in the first of these two surveys, which occurred in 2013. The second one had 149 people who participated, which occurred in 2014.
In the 2013 survey, the focus was on how psychiatric diagnosis affected kids. Forty percent felt that psychiatric diagnosis was not valuable. For the 60% that felt that psychiatric diagnoses can be valuable, 90% of them had reservations. That is, they said that it was only sometimes helpful, there was a danger of misdiagnosis, there was racism involved in diagnosis, and it leads to stigma and over-medication.
Ten percent were completely against diagnosis under any circumstance, some sharing their experiences pertaining to children. Examples of comments from this group follow:
“Medication makes you act out. My grandson was hyperactive, not ADHD and they wanted to put him on Ritalin – I told them no. Drugs at an early age can lead to hard core drugs later in life.”
“I worked with kids who had wrong diagnosis, and this is prevalent.”
“Kids get told in 1st grade they’re crazy—then it becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy.”
In the 2014 survey, the researchers:
“tried to go a little deeper and see if we could help people explore the apparent conflict around diagnosis, i.e., its value and its dangers. We also wanted to learn what they thought about the necessity and mandate of diagnosis.
We all know people who have gotten very depressed when they’ve lost a loved one, or children who cannot sit still in school, lots of folks who are angry and demoralized about not finding a job. Do you think any of these people need to get a diagnosis in order to get help with their emotional pain?
(IF THEY SAY YES, ASK THE NEXT 2 QUESTIONS):
Do we need to relate to them as having brain disorders? Or chemical imbalances?
Right now, in most settings, if you want to get help with ANY kind of emotional pain from a mental health professional, they are required to give you a diagnosis. Do you agree with that?
Are there other ways to support people emotionally? What do you think could help them?
Like me, you probably know people in your family, church, or at work who have serious emotional problems, who may have been diagnosed with major depression, bipolar or schizophrenia. Obviously people deserve and need top quality mental health care including access to medication. Do you think that even in these situations a diagnosis can limit the person, label them, and stigmatize them? If so, how?
From our past surveys we have found that people are conflicted about diagnosis and labels. They find it relieving to get a diagnosis and at the same time feel like the diagnosis can stigmatize or label them. Why do you think that so many of us are conflicted about this, feel it can be both helpful and harmful?
Here’s a brief summary of the finding, as described by Dr. Holzman:
Diagnosis Needed: 60% of respondents said no, people did not need a diagnosis to get help with their emotional pain. The majority of the 40% who said diagnosis was needed told us that that was the only way to get to talk to someone.
Only those who said yes, diagnosis was needed (40%), were asked the next two questions.
1a. Biological Basis: 89% of those who said diagnosis was needed said we shouldn’t consider such people as having a brain disorder or chemical imbalance.
1b. Diagnosis Required: 75% of those who said diagnosis was needed did not agree that it should be required.
Other Ways to Support (alternative types of treatment):
Everyone offered an alternative, with most people suggesting more than one. The most frequent responses involved talking to people—therapy, counseling, group therapy being the most common (including, “A center they can go to without getting diagnosed”), followed by family, friends, self-help and support groups.
A wide variety of social activities and life style changes were recommended—volunteering, hobbies, music, dance, writing, meditation, exercise, yoga, diet, prayer and creating community (“Have events that bring people out, like this fair”).
& 4. Concerns about Diagnosis: 90% (including those who thought it was needed) expressed concerns about the stigma of diagnosis, the dangers of misdiagnosis, and/or the over-medication that too often accompanies a diagnosis.
Once you have that label it doesn’t stay at the clinic. You carry it with you for a long time.
People start calling you crazy. It can be a shame for the family.
I had to fight to get counseling for my kid. They just wanted to give him drugs.
Getting a diagnosis limits life experience, you’re treated differently, you feel like an outcast.
It’s helpful to the clinic but not in everyday life.
It’s good to know what’s wrong, but it might make them feel worse about themselves and put them in a box.
It pigeon-holes people and the diagnosis becomes all that I am.
It stagnates them. It keeps them on one path with only one destination.
They think something’s wrong with them.
There is too much use of medication. It is a quick fix to avoid a real understanding.
Against it – children are still growing. Against medication.
So there you have it, some views other than mine about psychiatric name calling. In interpreting these findings, I think it’s important to bear in mind that the views of the people surveyed developed in the context of a multibillion dollar advertisement campaign by the pharmaceutical companies over many years that is designed to convince them that emotional concerns are diagnosable illnesses requiring medication treatment. How might the views of those surveyed been different without this high finance selling of the illness model?
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Some people will enjoy reading this blog by beginning with the first post and then moving forward to the next more recent one; then to the next one; and so on. This permits readers to catch up on some ideas that were presented earlier and to move through all of the ideas in a systematic fashion to develop their emotional intelligence. To begin at the very first post you can click HERE.
Dr. Kandel’s credentials are pretty impressive–he’s a Nobel Prize laureate and professor of brain science at Columbia University. Therefore, if you are among those who believe a person’s credentials should determine who is right and who is wrong, you need not read any further. You must simply conclude that what is referred to as mental illnesses are indeed brain diseases because you would be hard pressed to find someone with better credentials disagreeing with Dr. Kandel.
The argument that such labeling practices are not scientific, but, rather, value judgments, was intelligently made by William James when he defended the religious sentiment. He explained that pathologizing these sentiments as mental diseases was superficial medical talk. He called the reasoning doctors used to declare religious beliefs a type of mental illness, “medical materialism.”
assumes as a convenient hypothesis that the dependence of mental states on bodily conditions must be thoroughgoing and complete. If we adopt the assumption, then of course what medical materialism insists on must be true in a general way, if not every detail…. But now, I ask you, how can such an existential account of facts of mental history decide in one way or another on their spiritual significance? According to the general postulate of psychology just referred to, there is not a single one of our states of mind, high or low, healthy or morbid, that has not some organic process as its condition. Scientific theories are organically conditioned just as much as religious emotions are; and if we only knew the facts intimately enough, we should doubtless see “the liver” determining the dicta of the sturdy atheist as decisively as it does those of the Methodist under conviction anxious about his soul. When it alters one way the blood that percolates it, we get the Methodist, when in another way, we get the atheist form of mind. So of all our raptures and our drynesses, our longings and pantings, our questions and beliefs. They are equally organically founded, be they religious or of non-religious content.
All states of mind are related in extremely complex ways to neural functions. There is a crucial distinction to be made between a brain difference and a brain pathology. The significance of each state of mind must be tested, not by some neurological difference, but by the value of its fruits. When the term “pathological” is applied to an experience, rather than an identified physiological pathology, it wrongly implies a neutral science classification.
In contrast to biological arguments, psychosocial explanations of mental health concerns have been found to effectively improve images of people who are now being labeled as having a mental illness. It also appears to reduce fear.
Third party payer systems have a form that must be filled out whenever someone seeks mental health services under their plan. This form has a little box that currently says, “Diagnosis.” In that box, mental health professionals are required to fill in the DSM code that corresponds to their so-called diagnosis of the person seeking services.
