Tag: mental health services

Psychiatric Name Calling: Is There An Alternative?

Post author By Dr. Jeffrey Rubin
Post date February 24, 2015
5 Comments on Psychiatric Name Calling: Is There An Alternative?

The publishers of The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) currently hold a monopoly for classifying the concerns that lead people to seek mental health services. Recently on this blog, in a series of articles, I have been pointing out numerous faults of the DSM. To check out some examples of these, see my posts titled Name Calling by Psychiatrists: Is it Time to Put a Stop to it? and Are “Mental Illnesses” Really Potentially Helpful Tools?

In these critical posts, I have touched upon what I believe would be a distinctly better alternative to the DSM and argued that its creation, in breaking up this monopoly, would stimulate through creative competition, improved mental health services. Today, let’s take a closer look at this.

The Classification and Statistical Manual of Mental Health Concerns (CSM)

I called this proposed alternative manual, the CSM, and you can find a much fuller description of it in a peer reviewed journal HERE. In brief, its first chapter would begin by stating that the developed of the CSM fully recognize that individuality outruns any classification system. It is for this reason that the CSM does not seek to classify anyone. Instead, it classifies the expressed concerns of individuals seeking to have their concerns addressed by a mental health service provider.

The CSM begins from the perspective of the person seeking services. Because the expression of a mental health concern is a clearly observable event, by making it the event being classified in the CSM it solves the reliability problems that have been plaguing the DSM’s far more abstract concept of “mental disorders.”

After this statement, the CSM would clearly define its main construct:

A mental health concern occurs when a person seeking mental health services expresses to a mental health service provider a concern about any of these topics: behavior, emotion, mood, meaning of life, managing chronic pain, work, relationships, education, eating, cognition, sleep and challenging life situations.

Each of these topics would have separate major sections in the second chapter, and under each section would be a list of more specific concerns.

This second chapter would be devoted to listing all of the concerns that professionals tend to hear from those seeking their services. Each concern would be given a code that would be used for various administrative purposes such as insurance forms and computer filing systems. And then there would be, for each concern, a list of related search terms that can be used to assist people who want to utilize a search engine to find all the relevant literature regarding that particular concern.

The list of concerns would be identified by two types of surveys. First, a large sample of mental health service providers would be asked to list the various concerns that they are asked to address in their practice without couching them in pathological language and to stick as closely as possible to the language used by those seeking their services. So, a concern about feeling blue might simply be classified “feeling blue,” rather than the DSM’s “Major Depressive Disorder;” a concern about a child’s above average activity level might simply be classified as “above average activity level” rather than the DSM’s “Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder.” The second type of survey that would be used to generate the list of concerns that would appear in the CSM, would ask the membership of mental health service user organizations to list the various concerns that led them to seek mental health services. They, too, would be asked to avoid pathological terminology. For a number of practical reasons, a maximum of four words would be used for classifying each expressed concern in this chapter.

The final chapter of the CSM would be devoted to describing good practice guidelines for the use of psychological formulation, which is an assessment approach that is consistent with the CSM’s philosophy of not pathologizing individuals. Psychological formulation provides an approach that expands on the brief expressed concerns of individuals by developing a narrative of several paragraphs. It can be defined as the process involving a mental health service user and a mental health service provider co-constructing a hypothesis or ‘best guess’ about the origins of the mental health service user’s concerns in the context of his or her relationships, social circumstances, life events, and the sense that he or she has made of them. Once it has been established what the concerns are, the immediate next question is, ‘How do we jointly understand these experiences, why they arose, and how we might be able to address them?’

Unlike diagnosis, this type of psychological formulation is not about making an expert judgement, but about working closely with the individual to develop a shared understanding which will evolve over time. And, unlike diagnosis, it draws attention to the service user’s resources and strengths in surviving what are nearly always very challenging life situations.

Defending the CSM Approach

Now, some believe that the psychological formulation is all that is needed as an alternative to the DSM and that there is no need to join it with any classification manual such as the CSM. But keep in mind that currently the DSM is used by insurance companies and other third party payers such as Medicaid, Medicare, and Social Security. Insurance companies and these other third party payers have a form that must be filled out whenever someone seeks mental health services under their plan. This form has a little box that currently says, “Diagnosis.” In that box, mental health professionals must fill in the DSM code that corresponds to their so-called diagnosis of the person seeking services.

With the CSM proposal, all that we would be asking insurance companies to do differently in order to add value for their customers, is to slightly change that little box. Instead of just saying “Diagnosis” as it currently says, that box would add two little words, so it would end up saying “Diagnosis or Concern.” Then, when mental health professionals fill in the box, they would be given the choice to either write in the letters “DSM” and its code number that corresponds to its so-called diagnosis, or they would write the letters CSM and its code number that corresponds to the expressed concern. Mental health consumers would be given the choice to go to pathologizing mental health service providers or those using the CSM approach.

That’s all the change that would be required in order to increase value for insurance customers as well as other third party payers. And a major goal that all third party payers have is to increase value for their customers. The cost and effort for these payers would be minimum and we would have numerous testimonials from customers that documents that this change would be viewed as a significant improvement.

A psychological formulation approach, which requires several paragraphs to be completed, would be far too cumbersome for these payers to incorporate into their bureaucratic system. Moreover, a short word or phrase that could replace terms like “Major Depressive Disorder” or “Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder” is necessary for other practical forms of communication. For example, if I want to write a title for a research article, it would not be practical to insert into it several paragraphs. The psychological formulation approach would become far more widely used if it has some practical way of providing some short terms that are consistent with its non-pathologizing approach to conceptualizing an individual’s mental health concerns.

Some may argue that if everyone could go to a mental health professional merely to have their concerns addressed, then the system would soon be overloaded with clients and insurance policy costs would soar. Since insurance companies only cover people with more serious conditions known as “mental disorders,” so the argument goes, this limits the amount of people who can get to see a mental health professional.

Insurance and other third party payer executives are not stupid. They would readily understand, with a little explaining, that mental health service providers now using the current DSM do not turn anyone with a mental health insurance policy away who comes to their office expressing what I refer to as a mental health concern. Professionals are in the business of increasing their clients. Let’s be honest here; there are “close enough” matches throughout the DSM for anyone with mental health insurance coverage who currently wants mental health services to get it.

Here’s another reason why the CSM would improve the psychological formulation approach. In pretty much any of the advanced countries in the world, there is a rather large segment of the population that believes science has been an enormous help advancing our knowledge. The CSM, as already mentioned, is even more consistent with principles of science than the DSM because it solves the problem of reliability that has been a mess with the DSM. And for science minded people, each branch of science must have a system of classification that helps to organize concepts, to retrieve relevant research, and to be useful in formulating programs of research. In my view, the pairing of psychological formulation with the CSM’s list of brief descriptors of mental health concerns will fit well with this worldview.

And so, these are some of my arguments for uniting in the CSM proposal a classification system and the psychological formulation proposal. Together, both can clearly improve value for consumers of mental health services by providing a new choice, but only if consumers of mental health services role up their sleeves, organize, and effectively advocate for this type of change.

In summary then, the CSM is more consistent with principles of science. It is close enough to the worldview and administrative requirements of all of the stakeholders in the mental health field, thus reducing resistance that often comes with proposed changes. And the creation of the CSM would break up the DSM monopoly, thereby spurring creative approaches for understanding the nature of anguish, sadness and tears.

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Some people will enjoy reading this blog by beginning with the first post and then moving forward to the next more recent one; then to the next one; and so on. This permits readers to catch up on some ideas that were presented earlier and to move through all of the ideas in a systematic fashion to develop their emotional and social intelligence. To begin at the very first post you can click HERE.

Tags CSM, DSM, mental disorders, mental health, mental health concerns, mental health service, mental health services, mental illness, name calling, negative criticism, psychiatry, The Classification and Statistical Manual of Mental Health Concerns

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Psychiatric Name Calling: Is Science to Blame?

Post author By Dr. Jeffrey Rubin
Post date September 22, 2014
14 Comments on Psychiatric Name Calling: Is Science to Blame?

A couple of weeks ago I raised the question, “Name Calling by Psychiatrists: Is it Time to Put a Stop to it?” In response, some blamed the insurance companies and other third party payers for the name calling. Because it is true that these payers do require the pathologizing of people seeking mental health services, in last week’s article, I took a close look at that issue.

Others responding to my question argued that diagnosing mental illness is based on the principles of science. So, let’s look at this line of thought.

The Nature of Science

Science enquires what is the nature of something? what is its constitution, origin, and history? Human beings also make enquires of a different sort, What is the object’s importance, meaning, significance, or value now that it is once here? Neither judgment can be deduced immediately from the other. They proceed from diverse intellectual preoccupations, and the mind combines them only by making them first separately and then adding them together.

As Steven Jay Gould, professor of zoology and geology at Harvard University, explains it:

“The net of science covers the empirical realm: what is the universe made of (fact) and why does it work this way (theory). The net of religion extends over questions of moral meaning and value. These two magisteria do not overlap, nor do they encompass all inquiry (consider, for starters, the magisterium of art and the meaning of beauty). To cite the usual clichés, we get the age of rocks, and religion retains the rock of ages; we study how the heavens go, and they determine how to go to heaven.”

In the natural sciences there is a branch called pathology that classifies tumors, lesions, bone fractures, tissue tears, toxic reaction to a chemical, blockage of blood flow within the circulation system, blockage within or to an organ, and microbe infections. Pathologists have reliable ways of identifying and categorizing these naturally occurring entities. When we take a science view of each of these entities of interest to pathologists, it is not a value judgment if they exist or not. If ten pathologists look at a tumor, they can all see it, describe its color, density, weight and what each of the tumor’s cells look like under a microscope.

Pathologists, as scientists, have been studying these entities and sometimes they found that some of them are associated with certain physical complaints. For example, some people complain about headaches and vision problems. When they died, autopsies were carried out and often a tumor was present that was pressing against the optic nerve.

This finding led to a theory that for people who expressed this type of physical complaint, if an operation was carried out while the patients were still alive and this type of tumor was indeed pressing on the optic nerve, perhaps removing it would alleviate the complaint. Studies were carried out and it led eventually to a valued treatment.

The connections between the research findings of pathologists gave doctors some understanding of what was causing some of the physical complaints of their patients. But often doctors could not find evidence that any of the entities of interest to pathologists were the cause of the complaint. When this occurred, most doctors merely changed the expressed complaint into some medical jargon that sounded somewhat like those concerns that had been shown to be due to a pathological condition. In such cases, they offered some treatment that was often based more on the commercial art of medicine rather than science.

These doctors usually called both types of physical complaints (those with pathological findings and those without) “illnesses” or “disorders.” By doing so, the science of medicine and the art of medicine became blurred. And then, business interests became wrapped up in the various treatment options and principles of science began to become more and more murky when applied to the medical world.

Disorders and Psychiatry

In a book titled Psychiatric Persuasion by Elizabeth Lunbeck, there is considerable documentation that back at the turn of the 20th century when the main job of psychiatrists was running insane asylums their professional organization decided to expand their market by doing two things. 1. Persuade the public that more and more normal behaviors are pathologies that require psychiatric treatment, and 2. Develop a category system that converts all psychological concerns that a person might want to get help for into a language that sounds like a pathological condition. This would legitimize the treatment of anyone who came to their office, thus the argument that the current psychiatric “diagnosis” system has become a business tool while being promoted as science.

Now, it is certainly possible to create a categorical system consistent with science for the problems that come to the attention of psychiatrists and other mental health service providers that don’t confuse conditions that are associated with pathological findings and those that are not. Such a system would classify “mental health concerns,” rather than calling people names. A mental health concern occurs when a person seeking mental health services expresses to a mental health service provider a concern about any of the following topics: behavior, emotion, mood, meaning of life, managing chronic pain, work, relationships, education, eating, cognition and sleep. Two classes of mental health concerns are concerns expressed about oneself and concerns expressed about someone else.

One benefit of classifying “mental health concerns” rather than “mental disorders” has to do with inter-rater reliability. Consider being in a room with 100 psychologists, or even 100 average Joes and Jills, and a person in front of the room says she has been feeling depressed. A questioner asks the client, “Are you concerned about feeling depressed?” and the person says, “Yes.” If you asked for a survey of how many people in the room thinks the person has expressed a concern about being depressed, you would get, I believe, 100 percent agreement. Expressing a mental health concern is a specific action that people do, and therefore it is clearly observable.

Research on the inter-rater reliability of the mental disorders classification system has demonstrated that its inter-rater reliability is very problematic.

Science is Not to Blame

It is not science that is to blame for psychiatric name calling; it is the psychiatric business tool that is cleverly designed to capitalize on the public’s respect for science.

When we begin to use a classification system that does not clearly separate principles of science from values involved in business interests, other values start to slip into the classification process as well. Early on when the pathologizing of human experience was just getting underway, William James made a number of relevant comments about this.

James argued that experiences that are commonly viewed as unhealthy or morbid are really “an essential part of every character” and give life “a truer sense of values.” To support his contention, James first provided three examples of famous individuals who expressed concerns about melancholy. Such experiences today, if expressed to a psychiatrist, would probably be converted into a so-called “diagnosis” of “major depressive disorder.” St. Paul, the religious figure of the New Testament, Cesare Lombrosa, a late 19th-century Italian criminologist, and Immanual Kant, the 18th-century German philosopher, became, according to their biographies, better as a result of their troubling experiences.

Although hallucinations can mean madness to some, James presented the case of Socrates who “once stood motionless for many hours in the cold and spoke of having a guiding demon.” Attempting to counter the association between pathologies and hallucinations, James stated, “Even if this demon [of Socrates] were really meant hallucinations of hearing, we know now that one in eight or ten of the population has had such an experience and that for insanity we must resort to other tests than these.”

James stated that there is no end to the possible types of obsessions that we see all around us. What benefit can such experiences have? James wrote about Henry Borg, founder of the American Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals in 1866; Charles Henry Parkhurst, a Presbyterian clergyman and reformer who held a New York City pastorate from 1880 to 1918 and who launched a furious attack on organized crime in state government that led to an official investigation; Dorothea Dix, a mid-19th-century humanitarian who visited the insane asylums and successfully advocated for legislation to improve the care for those labeled mentally ill.

Later, James stated, “Individuals are types of themselves and enslavement to conventional names and their associations is only too apt to blind the student to the facts before him.”

James concluded that,

“Any peculiarity that is of use to a man is a point of soundness in him, and what makes a man sound for one function may make him unsound for another. Moreover we are all instruments for social use, and if sensibilities, obsessions and other… peculiarities can so combine with the rest of our constitution as to make us the more useful to our kind, why, then, we should not call them in that context points of unhealthiness, but rather the reverse . . . The trouble is that such writers [pathologizers]. . . use the descriptive names of symptoms merely as an artifice for giving objective authority to their personal dislikes. The medical terms become mere appreciative clubs to knock a man down with. . . . The only sort of being, in fact, who can remain as the typical normal man, after all the individuals with degenerative symptoms have been rejected, must be a perfect nullity… Who shall absolutely say that the morbid has no revelations about the meaning of life? That the healthy minded view so-called is all?”

To illustrate what James means here, consider an article in the American Journal of Psychiatry (May, 2004), titled “Virginia Woolf (1882-1941).” Although she is described by psychiatrists as having bipolar disorder, her diaries and letters, document movingly, her emotional extremes and her capacity to savor the “ordinary rhythms of life.” At times Woolf railed against her distressing emotional experiences, felt frustrated and impeded by them, and at other times she felt it was essential to her. In diaries and letters, she returned to the question repeatedly without reaching a resolution: were her emotional experiences a terrible obstacle to her art, or were they the necessary condition for it?

For those trying to sell psychiatric drugs, a simplistic answer to this question is eagerly promoted. Science has not provided a definitive answer to this question as far as I am concerned, and throwing around phrases such as “the brain is malfunctioning in depression,” or “the brain has a chemical imbalance in depression” goes way beyond the available evidence.

Psychiatric labels are like masks held on by rubberband straps. They hide some of the characteristics of an individual. Wearing such masks may serve some purposes, but after a while they start to get uncomfortable for many, particularly around the ears. Let those who want to wear these masks be free to do so. But let those who want to meet us face to face, also be free to do so.

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Tags disrespectful, DSM, free social intelligence and emotional intelligence curriculum, insults, mental disorders, mental health, mental health concerns, mental health services, mental illness, name calling, psychiatry, science, Steven Jay Gould, William James

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Psychiatric Name Calling: Are the Insurance Companies to Blame?

Post author By Dr. Jeffrey Rubin
Post date September 16, 2014
5 Comments on Psychiatric Name Calling: Are the Insurance Companies to Blame?

Last week, I posted an article titled “Name Calling by Psychiatrists: Is it Time to Put a Stop to it?” It created quite a stir and it’s currently challenging my two previous most popular posts—“Teaching Children How to to Deal with Criticism” and “Is it Wise to be Assertive?”—for the number one spot.

The article points out that by using the term “diagnosis” in psychiatric terminology it misleads people in a variety of ways. For example, when psychiatrists provide their patients a so-called diagnosis many people believe there is now a valid explanation for why they are struggling with their personal difficulties. Instead, all that has really happened is that the psychiatrist has converted the expressed concern of the patient into pathologizing language.

The manual that psychiatrists use when deciding which words to use when converting concerns to “diagnoses” is called The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM). Of course as this manual was developed there was a huge financial interest to utilize language that encourages the perception that an expressed concern is a very, very serious life-long condition that requires medical treatment for a lifetime. Consequently, when patients express a concern about being depressed, the psychiatrist informs them that they have “major depressive disorder,” and often couple this with statements such as, “This is a serious lifetime condition that must be managed for a lifetime.” Any language that suggests that there is substantial evidence that most people recover even without treatment runs counter to the psychiatric business plan.

Among the many comments that I received about the name calling article are those that point out that most of the doctors who are using the psychiatric terminology provided in the DSM are not psychiatrists. Pediatricians, general practitioners, internists, psychologists, and neurologists daily call people these names. Other comments present the argument that it is the pharmaceutical companies that promote the pathologizing of human concerns in order to convince people to ingest their drugs.

I’ll be exploring these issues in coming weeks. But today, let’s focus in on the argument that the real group of people at fault for this type of name-calling is the third party payers such as insurance companies, Medicaid, Medicare, and Social Security. After all, by far, the DSM terms are used most by these types of entities.

The DSM and Third Party Payers

Most people in the United States who seek mental health services don’t directly pay for them. Instead, they have insurance policies that cover some, or all, of the fees; or they qualify for Medicaid, Medicare, or Social Security benefits. Insurance companies and these other agencies are called third party payers.

Third party payers currently have a form that must be filled out whenever someone seeks mental health services under their plan. That form has boxes for the name of the person seeking services, his or her contact information, policy number, some information about who is being asked to provide services, and then, imbedded in all of this, is a little box that currently says, “Diagnosis.” In that box, mental health professionals must fill in the DSM code that corresponds to their “diagnosis” of the person seeking services.

Third party payers initially developed their form for people who were seeking medical services for physical complaints. Physicians would fill in the diagnosis box with a code that corresponded to a list of diagnoses in their pathology manuals based on a visual inspection of a tissue tear, the results of x-rays, blood test, or a pathologist examining a tissue sample of a tumor under a microscope. Sometimes it was based on a report from a toxicologist because it was theorized that the patient had been exposed to some toxic substance. In each of these cases, the diagnosis that was provided actually did provide some understanding for why patients were struggling with their expressed physical complaints.

However, I hasten to point out that in many cases physicians were unable to uncover the reason for the physical complaint. At such times they often did pretty much what psychiatrists do today—they converted the physical complaint into medical jargon, typically using Latin derived syllables, and then stuck them into the third party payer’s “diagnosis” box on the third party payer forms, prescribed some treatment, and low and behold, third party payers paid the doctors just like they did when a real diagnosis was provided.

A physician once confided in me that for the majority of his cases he was unable to identify the reason for the physical complaint but he nevertheless provided some diagnosis and a prescription for a pill. “If I didn’t,” he said, “my patients would feel that they wasted their money by coming to see me.” I then asked him how he felt about misleading his patients in this way. “Well,” he replied, “if my patients feel that I have made a real diagnosis and prescribed some pills, they feel a sense of being reassured and the pills can have a placebo effect which may be very curative in its own way.”

“The pills that you prescribe,” I replied, “are not simply substances with no physical effects beside the placebo effect, they have a number of real serious side effects associated with their use. Is that really ethical?”

“Well, the physical side effects often help the placebo effect because the patient feels something is really physically happening. It is part of what reassures them that what was prescribed has a powerful effect. When weighing the risk of serious side effects versus the minor side effects that can be helpful, I make my decisions on what to prescribe.”

And so, that’s a little of my understanding of the reasoning behind this type of misleading name-calling and prescribing practices of physicians dealing with physical complaints. I prefer honesty. However, for those who prefer this fatherly treatment that is mixed with huge financial interests, I’m advocating that they continue to get what they want.

Now, once third party payers began to provide coverage for mental health services, their administrative forms didn’t have to be changed. There was already a precedent for placing in the “diagnosis” box on the form fake diagnoses, and psychiatrists seeing that this business model was a source of a great deal of money created the DSM.

What would be a Reasonable Alternative to the DSM?

For those who prefer to be treated honestly, can an alternative to the DSM be developed?

The alternative I’ve been working on is called The Classification and Statistical Manual of Mental Health Concerns, or, for short, the CSM. With this approach, no individuals would be classified, only their expressed concerns.

With the CSM proposal, all that we would be asking insurance companies to do differently in order to add value to their customers, is to slightly change that little box that currently requires a diagnosis or a word pretending to be a diagnosis. Instead of just saying “Diagnosis” as it currently says, that box would just add two little words, so it would end up saying “Diagnosis or Concern.” Then, when mental health professionals fill in the box, they would be given the choice to either write in the letters DSM and its code number that corresponds to its so- called diagnosis, or they would write the letters CSM and its code number that corresponds to the expressed concern.

The cost and efforts for insurance companies would be minimal, and we would have numerous testimonials from customers that documents that this change would be viewed as a significant improvement.

Now, some of the insurance company executives might pause and say, “Wait a minute. You’re asking us to permit the use of the CSM as an alternative to the DSM. Just wait a minute. The DSM has been developed by mental health experts and is backed by a major mental health professional organization—the American Psychiatric Association. Does the CSM have that type of authority to back it up?”

If we prepared for this, we will be able to answer that the CSM was also developed by mental health experts and does have several mental health professional organizations backing up its use as an alternative to the DSM. I believe this can be achieved. We have in our alternatives group several people who would qualify as mental health experts, and I think we can get some more involved as well. And when the latest edition of the DSM was released several professional organizations expressed a strong desire that an alternative to the DSM be developed. I think it’s reasonable to assume that at least some of them would agree to back this alternative, especially if we involve them in its development.

In short, the creation of the CSM would permit us to present to insurance company executives and other third party payer administrators a real alternative to the DSM. It would be virtually cost free for them to permit its use, it would have the authority of being developed by experts in the mental health field, the backing of mental health professional organizations, and it adds value for a significant number of their customers.

The CSM Would also Help Mental Health Service Providers

Now, besides the insurance companies and other third party payers, the other big group of people in America that is currently using the DSM is mental health services providers. How would they react to being given the choice to replace the DSM code with the CSM code on third party payer forms when they felt in their professional judgment that it was appropriate? Well, we get a little sense of what their reaction would be from a survey Paula Caplan tells us about in her book, They Say You’re Crazy. According to this survey, over 70 percent of those practitioners who responded to the survey said that the only way they use the DSM is to fill out the insurance form. Other than that, it doesn’t help them at all.

To those who believe that the use of the current DSM terminology helps to enhance the placebo effect of treatment, keep in mind that this is a testable theory. We can arrange for studies that compare the outcomes of service providers that utilize the DSM coding system with service providers that employ the CSM coding system. But that would be an approach that employs basic principles of science, rather than unsupported claims backed by enormous financial interests.

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Tags disrespectful, DSM, insults, insurance companies, mental disorders, mental health, mental health services, mental illness, name calling, psychiatric disorders, psychiatry